146. Planning Team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordinating Agency:</th>
<th>Primary Agency:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA)*</td>
<td>Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kansas Division of Emergency Management (KDEM)*</td>
<td>Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE)*</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Supporting Agencies:**
- Governor’s Office*
- Kansas Division of Emergency Management (KDEM)*
- Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP)*
- Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT)*
- Kansas Department of Wildlife, Parks and Tourism (KDWPT)*
- Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI)*
- Office of the State Fire Marshal (OSFM)*
- Kansas Forest Service (KFS)*
- Kansas State University (KSU)*
- Kansas National Guard (KSNG)*
- Kansas Attorney General’s Office
- Laboratories*

**Federal Agencies:**
- US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
- Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
- United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
- United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

**Private Sector/Non-Governmental Organizations:**
- Kansas Agriculture Organizations
- Kansas Farmers and Ranchers

*Indicates agency/organization has responsibilities specifically outlined in annex

147. Purpose

It is the purpose of this annex to define the actions and roles necessary to provide a coordinated response to a food or agriculture incident within or affecting the State of Kansas. This annex provides guidance to state agencies with a general concept of potential emergency assignments before, during, and following emergency situations as they relate to a food or agriculture-related incident. It also allows for the systematic integration of emergency resources when activated and does not replace county emergency operations plans or the Kansas Response Plan. Agency roles and responsibilities outlined in this annex do
not vary from the agency’s statutory authorities. The annex has been developed to ensure all agencies (local, state, and federal) and industry partners are aware of the roles and responsibilities of various agencies, various levels of government and the private sector in responding to these very specific incidents that may occur in Kansas.

148. Structure

This annex starts with an overarching description of how food and agriculture emergencies are managed by the agencies with statutory authority. Attached to this annex are three specific appendices that describe response actions in more detail, based on the nature of the incident. Specific Standard Operating Guides have been developed that describe detailed response actions for various types of food and agriculture emergencies. These guides are maintained by the agencies having responsibility for certain response actions. KDA is currently in the process of defining response activities for a feed (food for animals) emergency. Once completed, an additional appendix describing those activities will be added to this incident annex.

149. Scope

The protocols outlined in this annex apply to food, animal and plant incidents requiring a coordinated state response. These incidents may be naturally occurring, accidental, or intentional. Actions described in this annex may take place with or without a Governor’s emergency declaration or a federal emergency declaration by the President, the Secretary of USDA, or the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Most incidents that require activation of this annex will involve only a handful of agencies and will be resolved using existing agency authorities and resources. The complexity and scope of the incident will determine the levels of activation of emergency operations centers (state and local) and other supporting facilities and systems.

This annex describes roles that are different from an ESF 11 Response. KDA is the lead coordinating agency for ESF 11 and those roles and responsibilities describe what agencies do to protect food, agriculture, and natural and cultural resources after all hazards events and disasters. In this annex, the food or agriculture problem IS the event. When inspectors respond to communities that suffer from floods or tornadoes, that is a response under ESF 11. This incident annex describes how we respond to incidents that start and end in the food and agriculture arena. Examples include: an intentional or accidental food contamination event, a highly pathogenic plant pest infestation, or a livestock disease affecting multiple producers necessitating a state and/or federal response.

Most food and agriculture incidents occur in several (or many) states at the same time. This interstate component results in the need for federal cooperation and it is expected that federal agencies will play an active role in our response to these types of incidents. Often this is done by conference calls and frequent communication and coordination. As events escalate, federal personnel may be asked to deploy to assist with a state response.
150. Situation

150.1. Hazard Profile

Kansas is subjected to the effects of many disasters, varying widely in type and magnitude from local communities to statewide in scope. Disaster conditions could be a result of a number of natural phenomena, such as floods, severe thunderstorms, flooding, drought, severe winter weather, wildfires, epidemics, severe heat, or high winds. These natural disasters are especially troublesome to producers as the economic damages related to natural disasters can cripple the jurisdiction and there are few federal programs available to assist farmers and ranchers.

Apart from natural disasters, Kansas is subject to a myriad of other disaster contingencies, such as derailments, aircraft accidents, transportation accidents involving chemicals and other hazardous materials, plant explosions, chemical oil and other hazardous material spills, leaks or pollution problems, dumping of hazardous wastes, building or bridge collapses, utility service interruptions, energy shortages, civil disturbances or riots, terrorism, warfare, applicable criminal acts, or a combination of any of these. Since there are large numbers of trucks that move through Kansas hauling live animals, food products and ingredients to neighboring states, anything that affects the movement of these commodities has an economic impact on Kansas and surrounding states. Also, since there are several major highways that cross the state, stopping or controlling agriculture movement is difficult and will require coordination with multiple governmental agencies and departments.

150.2. Characteristics

150.2.1. Location

The state of Kansas is located centrally within the continental United States with intermodal transportation routes (rail, river and road) running throughout the state.

The surrounding jurisdictions of Missouri, Colorado, Nebraska and Oklahoma also maintain substantial agricultural production and distribution.

150.2.2. Demographic

The state of Kansas has a population of approximately 2.8 million people. The state is primarily an agricultural state that relies heavily on agriculture and food production as an economic base. The census of cattle within the state of Kansas exceeds the number of residents living in Kansas. The state of Kansas is recognized as one of the top dairy growth states.

150.2.3. Areas of Interest and High Risk

Kansas is home to several major river, road and rail routes which are used for transportation of hazardous materials. The Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station is located in New Strawn, Coffey County, Kansas. The Kansas Biosecurity Research Institute is the only bio-safety level-3 bio-containment facility in the US that can accommodate high-consequence pathogen research on food animals, food crops and food processing all under one roof. The National
Bio and Agro-Defense Facility is under construction in Manhattan, KS; and should be conducting research by 2023. Kansas is home to three military installations: Fort Riley, Fort Leavenworth, and the McConnell Air Force Base.

150.2.4. Special Events
Athletic and sporting events draw in thousands to hundreds of thousands of people to concentrated areas on a regular basis. Major livestock and equestrian events also draw people and animals together multiple times a year in multiple locations.

150.2.5. Economic Base and Infrastructure
Southwestern Kansas generates more than 40% of the economic activity for agriculture in the state. This is primarily through feed lots and production/packing facilities. Hamilton County and the immediate surrounding area represent over 50% of milk production for the state of Kansas. There are 305 licensed dairy farms within the state of Kansas. Over 1/5 of wheat production and half of sorghum for the United States is grown in Kansas. There are 64,700 farms encompassing over 46 million acres. The Kansas livestock inventory includes over 6 million cattle and calves, almost 2 million pigs, and 70,000 sheep.

Agriculture and food integrity is interdependent on fresh water supply, including the maintenance of waste water treatment facilities, the integrity of water aquifers (i.e. Ogallala), and a power supply for production/packing plants and retail locations, etc.

Kansas is home to Federally licensed meat plants, private food production and packing plants run by national corporations and small, locally owned and operated plants that all rely on the maintained integrity of critical infrastructure.

There are over 13,000 retail food facilities, cafeterias, etc. within the state of Kansas.

151. Planning Assumptions
I. Using contagious animal diseases, exotic plant diseases and pests or other means to attack, or to threaten an attack on the farm-to-table pathway could result in severe economic losses and public health consequences. Early detection is critical and encompasses a variety of response actions at all levels of government, industry, producers and the private sector.

II. Surveillance systems are slowly being developed for food and agriculture incidents that would detect the presence of radiological, chemical, or biological agents. These systems must be monitored continuously for early detection to be effective. If these systems are triggered, environmental and product sampling may occur along with additional human and animal surveillance to confirm or rule out a case. Additional response to a radiological, chemical, or biological attack would be needed from supporting agencies.

III. Vector/contamination control may require discarding large quantities of agricultural products and organic matter, invoking embargoes or trade restrictions, culling livestock or poultry, and identifying alternative sources of food.

IV. A food or agriculture incident, either intentional or not, may impact international trade.

V. Food and agriculture incidents do not respect jurisdictional boundaries and would require coordinated efforts between multiple local, tribal, State, regional, national, and international
entities. An intentional act against the farm-to-table pathway would likely overwhelm the capabilities of any one entity, further enforcing the need for coordinated efforts.

VI. Public-private partnerships are critical to mitigate any effects of a food or agriculture-related incident.

VII. The receipt of a threat against the agricultural community, in and of itself, could initiate response actions at all levels of government and may result in generating hysteria among the general public.

VIII. Depending on the causative substance of the contamination, contaminated foodstuffs may need to be considered and handled as hazardous waste.

IX. Suspected infected locations, machinery, distribution centers, restaurants, eateries, and transport vehicles may need to be cleaned, disinfected, and re-evaluated for contamination.

X. Storm systems or wind currents may easily move certain plant pathogens or other pests.

152. Concept of Operations

The key elements for an effective response to a food or agriculture incident include the following:

*Incident identification* - Incident identification involves the rapid identification, detection, and confirmation of the incident. Incident identification also defines notification and action triggers.

*Incident management* - Incident management may involve activating agency Departmental Operations Centers (DOCs) and Multi Agency Coordination Centers (MACCs). For complex incidents the state and/or counties may activate their emergency operations centers (EOCs). Additional incident management activities include: establishing the chain of command and establishing incident command posts and other operational components, such as incident management teams, in order to respond to the event.

*Communication and coordination* - Communication and coordination involves establishing lines of communication, internally with lead and supporting agencies, externally with other neighboring jurisdictions, and concurrently with the private sector. Communication and coordination also involves the dissemination of information to advise the public of the incident.

*Assessment, control, and containment* - Assessment, control, and containment includes the control, containment, decontamination, and disposal of infected, contaminated, or adulterated products, animals, and property to ensure effective recovery of the infrastructure impacted. An assessment of environmental contamination and the extent of cleanup, decontamination, and disposal of livestock carcasses, plants, or food products also may be involved.

These actions include the means to determine how the agent involved was transmitted, an assessment of the efficiency of transmission and further risk of transmission, and a determination of public health and economic implications and consequences. Continued surveillance is key to ensuring that the incident is adequately contained in a timely manner.

*Recovery* - Following a food or agriculture incident, recovery is key to ensuring that there is a continued market for goods. Since the farm-to-table pathway has been globalized, an incident involving food and agriculture would likely impact trade internationally. A quick recovery will help ensure that the market becomes re-established for goods in a short time period.

152.1. Incident Identification
State or local authorities are likely to be among the first to recognize the initial indication of intentional or naturally occurring contamination of food, of highly infective plant or animal disease, or of an economically devastating plant pest infestation or animal disease. Recognition may come from a significantly increased number of people reporting ill to health care providers, increased reporting of sick animals to veterinarians or animal health officials, or numerous plant anomalies reported by local officials, agricultural extension agents, or the public. Other sources may include routine public/private laboratory surveillance, inspection reports, consumer complaint systems, and various hotlines. Therefore, the most critical information requirements (CIR) are surveillance information, identification of the cause of the incident, a determination of whether the incident is intentional or naturally occurring, and the identification of the human or animal population and/or plants at risk.

For the purposes of this annex an incident is defined by the severity of the threat and the need for additional resources to respond. Activation of this annex will be initiated by the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA), or the Kansas Animal Health Commissioner (or their designees). KDA and KDHE use a scope and severity index tool to determine the level of activation necessary to respond to various types of incidents and emergencies. These indexes are maintained in agency Standard Operating Guides for activation and include the following triggers:

I. Confirmation of lab results indicating the need for an extraordinary response
II. Clinical diagnosis of specific diseases of concern in humans or animals
III. Known intentional act
IV. Occurrences in other states or North America
V. Media reports and rumors
VI. Severity of patient outcome
VII. Number of confirmed or suspected cases
VIII. Results of initial interviews and case investigations
IX. Current intelligence
X. Trace-forward or trace-backs indicate contamination, pests, or disease from which it came from or destined for Kansas

Food and agriculture incidents require a significant amount of interagency coordination. When an incident is first detected and this annex is activated, agency Departmental Operations Centers (DOCs) and/or Incident Command Posts (ICP) would be activated to coordinate the initial response. In a food emergency, it is likely that KDHE and KDA would stand up their DOC’s. The lead agency in a food or animal health emergency with primarily human health consequences would be KDHE, the KDA is the lead agency for all other food and agriculture emergencies. It is important to note that federal agencies (USDA, FDA, EPA, etc.) would likely be highly involved in responses involving food and agriculture.

152.1.1. Notification

A potential or actual incident requiring a coordinated state response involving contaminated food, infected animals or plants, or an economically devastating plant pest infestation shall be brought to the immediate attention of the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Agriculture and the KDA Emergency Management Coordinator (or their designees). The Emergency Management Coordinator will then initiate the appropriate notifications as
outlined in the KDA Incident Notification Standard Operation Guide. All incidents will be reported to the Governor, the Kansas Division of Emergency Management, affected counties, and appropriate state and federal agencies. If terrorist activity is suspected in connection with the incident, the Federal Bureau of Investigation will also be notified.

### 152.1.2. Activation

Once notified of a potential incident, the Kansas Department of Agriculture will activate the KDA Incident Management Team (KDA IMT) who will work out of the KDA Headquarters Building in Manhattan, Kansas. The team will coordinate with internal program staff, other state agencies, and federal counterparts. The team will take direction from the policy group which is comprised of executive leadership of the Department and may include representatives from other state and federal agencies. Some or all of the ensuing actions may include:

I. Targeted epidemiologic investigation.
II. Increased surveillance for patients and animals with certain clinical signs and symptoms.
III. Increased surveillance of plants for signs of disease or other pest infestation.
IV. Targeted inspection of human food and animal feed manufacturing, distributing, retail, and other facilities, as appropriate.
V. Increased inspection of plants and animals for contamination.
VI. Notification and coordination with appropriate stakeholders from government agencies, industry, and the public.

### 152.2. Incident Management

I. The IMT will ensure that the Kansas Division of Emergency Management has been notified and they will be invited to send a liaison and a policy group representative for all IMT activations.
II. IMT members will be made up of KDA employees that have been trained and exercised to respond to food and agriculture emergencies. Representatives from USDA -APHIS, FDA, the FBI, and Kansas State University personnel may serve on the IMT, if needed.
III. The Kansas Division of Emergency Management will determine the appropriate level for SEOC activation based on the expected severity and duration of the incident.
IV. The Liaison Officer is responsible for establishing immediate communications with affected stakeholder organizations, industry, elected officials, and bordering states.
V. The IMT Public Information Officer may reach out to members of the Industry Multiagency Coordination Group (MAC Group), made up of representatives from industry to assist with public information and coordination activities.
VI. The Incident Commander for the KDA Incident Management Team will be the KDA program manager or division director with the statutory authority to direct the response.

### 152.3. Response Actions

I. Determine whether a criminal investigation into the incident is warranted, ensure proper authorities are notified.
II. Once activated, the IMT will determine operational periods and develop incident action plans and situation reports.
III. Incident action plans and situation reports will be shared with appropriate stakeholders for the duration of the incident.

IV. All outside resources will be requested through KDEM, or the SEOC (if activated).

V. All resource requests will be validated by the IMT – local requests for resources included.

VI. Incident Command Posts may be established in the affected areas or the IMT may activate appropriate task forces or strike teams.

152.4. Communication and Coordination

I. The Kansas Division of Emergency Management will activate the State JIC at the request of state or local authorities, or when KDEM determines it is necessary. All media releases will be approved by the policy group responsible for the incident. For an incident requiring activation of this annex, that policy group would be located in Manhattan, Kansas.

II. KDA uses the Industry MAC Group, made up of communication experts and leaders from industry associations. Members of this team may be utilized to assist with public messaging in the event of a food or agriculture emergency.

III. WebEOC will be utilized to provide updates to responding agencies and relay information back to EOC’s and department operations center(s). Webinars and conference calls will be scheduled to ensure maximum communication with participating entities and other interested stakeholders.

IV. The Liaison Officer will establish communication, facilitate incident management and policy coordination, and provide regular updates with bordering states.

V. The Liaison Officer will identify any policy issues that need coordination between bordering states. The responsible official from Kansas will work with the bordering states to coordinate and resolve any issues.

VI. The KDA Communications team, led by the IMT PIO, will establish communications with the private sector and will prepare and update basic fact sheets, key messages, and other information materials for distribution to partners, stakeholders, and the public through appropriate established channels.

152.5. Assessment, Control and Containment

The KDA IMT will use the Incident Command System (ICS) to direct and control the incident response. The Operations Section Chief will determine the strategy for response based on the objectives set by the incident commander. Measures that may be taken include:

I. Implement surveillance and outbreak investigations to provide continuous monitoring of events.

II. Collect samples of products and conduct sample analysis.

III. Determine public health risks.

IV. Request product recalls.

V. Conduct trace-backs and trace-forwards to determine the index case and extent of the outbreak.

VI. Conduct disposal of contaminated materials to ensure effective recovery of the infrastructure impacted.

VII. Conduct cleaning and disinfection and/or virus elimination activities.

VIII. Conduct evidence gathering for a criminal investigation.

IX. Establish quarantine or embargos to mitigate the incident.

X. Establish movement controls (permitted and non-permitted) of affected products.
XI. Arrange for the provision of security at movement control areas, quarantined areas, and closed roads.
XII. Provide public education on affected products.
XIII. Assess environmental contamination.

152.6. Recovery Operations
The KDA Policy Group will work to establish a recovery team at the earliest opportunity to resolve long-term issues related to pre- and post-harvest food production impacted by the incident, encourage immediate business recovery and foster long-term economic recovery. This team will also evaluate economic implications and consequences and work to ensure business continuity whenever the risk is deemed acceptable.

I. Determine what continued surveillance is needed and the timeline for continued surveillance
II. Determine the conditions under which recovery would be complete
III. Remove movement controls on food, water, crops, and livestock as soon as possible
IV. Restore essential food and animal production and retail services
V. Track costs for reimbursement
VI. Respond to the media and communicate with the public to address concerns and/or rumors
VII. Conduct hazard evaluations to ensure safety of response teams and the public
VIII. Identify gaps and initiate repair of response plan

153. Responsibilities
Most departments/agencies of government have emergency functions in addition to their normal, day-to-day duties. These emergency functions usually parallel or complement normal functions. Each department/agency is responsible for developing and maintaining its own emergency management procedures. This section lists agency roles and responsibilities as they relate to food and agriculture incidents in general. If the responses are the same through-out the continuum of incidents, they will not be repeated in the incident specific appendix.

153.1. Coordinating/Primary Agency:

153.1.1. Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA)
I. Provides overall responsibility and authority for coordinating response.
II. Allocates agency resources and approves allocation of supporting resources.
III. Leads external and internal communication activities and ensures messages are coordinated.
IV. Activates KDA Incident Management Team (IMT)
   A. Sets overall incident-related priorities.
   B. Monitors incident response to ensure objectives are met.
   C. Identifies critical resource needs.
   D. Ensures that short term recovery, transitions into full recovery operations.
V. Implements embargos on contaminated products.
VI. Collaborates and coordinates with appropriate federal counterparts.
VII. Requests voluntary recalls.

VIII. Defines affected areas and control zones.

IX. Prepares information for dissemination to the public.

X. Approves the use of pesticides to mitigate pathogens and other pests on crops or in livestock and food facilities.

XI. Directs or assists in response actions to include:
   A. Quarantine
   B. Surveillance
   C. Outbreak investigations
   D. Trace-back and trace-forward
   E. Vector control
   F. Movement controls
   G. Disposal and Destruction
   H. Cleaning and disinfection and/or virus elimination

153.2. Primary Agency:

153.2.1. Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE)

I. Shares lead agency responsibility if the incident involves food products or zoonotic disease outbreaks (KDHE would be lead for human health components)

II. Provides emergency medical care information and coordination.

III. Issues health advisories.

IV. Identifies local health facilities, including hospitals, clinics, dialysis centers, and nursing or rehabilitation centers, supplying and using medical and health items.

V. Identifies at-risk populations, including the elderly and very young, and populations requiring specific life-saving services (e.g., dialysis or assistance with breathing).

VI. Provides vaccination information for the prevention of disease.

VII. Provides public information and education as it relates to zoonotic diseases.

VIII. Assists in the preparation of technical information as it relates to the environment and possible impacts.

IX. Facilitates and guides disposal of contaminated materials

X. Manages environmental permitting.

XI. Collects samples and analyzes results.

153.3. Support Agencies:

153.3.1. Governor's Office

I. Responsible for coordinating State resources to address the full spectrum of actions to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents in an all-hazards context to include terrorism, natural disasters, accidents, and other contingencies.

II. Make, amend, and rescind orders and regulations.

III. Provides leadership and plays a key role in communicating to the public and in helping people, businesses, and organizations cope with the consequences of any type of declared emergency within the State.
IV. Encourages participation in mutual aid and implements authorities for the State to enter into mutual aid agreements with other States, tribes, and territories to facilitate resource-sharing.

V. Is the Commander-in-Chief of State military forces (National Guard when in State Active Duty or Title 32 United States Code (U.S.C. status and the authorized State militias).

VI. Requests federal assistance when it becomes clear that State or tribal capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded or exhausted.

VII. Makes disaster declarations.

VIII. Ensures coordinated resources through delegation.

IX. Issues executive orders.

X. Initiates other protective action decisions as necessary.

XI. Sends representatives to the Joint Information Center.

XII. Resolves conflicts among state agencies.

153.3.2. Laboratories (General)

I. Provides analytical testing of food, environmental, animal, and human clinical samples for pathogens, toxins, and chemicals.

II. Conducts analytical testing related to product trace-backs.

III. Tests samples for evidence of contamination by zoonotic or epizootic organisms.

IV. Coordinates information and data sharing.

V. Provides timely reports of laboratory results.

VI. Maintains chain-of-custody where and when needed.

VII. Provides sample collection tools, equipment, and guidance to field investigators.

153.3.3. Kansas Division of Emergency Management (KDEM)

I. Manages SEOC staffing and functioning.

II. Maintains and coordinates communications with local emergency managers and ESF Coordinators.

III. Issues emergency public information when approved by policy group

IV. Maintains alert and warning systems.

V. Serves TAG who has broad authorities that are described in the KRP.

VI. Activates SEOC, when activated KDEM:
   A. Requests assistance from other jurisdictions
   B. Requests and coordinates state assistance
   C. Requests and coordinates Federal assistance
   D. Coordinates acquisition of resources from state agencies, local jurisdictions, other states and contractors

VII. All other responsibilities tasked via the KRP.

153.3.4. Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP)

I. Assists with traffic control and enforcement of movement control orders.

II. Assists with protection of critical infrastructure.

III. Controls and limits access to the scene of the incident.

IV. Supplements communications.

V. Assists with all evacuation and quarantine efforts.
VI. Assists with emergency transportation of samples.
VII. Monitors and detains, if necessary, outbound and inbound transporters of commodities at pre-identified traffic control points across the State.

**153.3.5. Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI)**

I. Conduct a threat assessment with appropriate local, state and federal partners.
II. Coordinate investigative and forensic response with the State and with the FBI.
III. Initiating a criminal investigation as determined by KBI policy.
IV. Arrange for the collection, transport, and forensic testing and examination of evidentiary samples.
V. Assist the FBI with field screen samples for explosiveness, radioactivity, and corrosively.
VI. Participate in the FBI Headquarters conference call [Threat-Credibility-Evaluation (TCE) call] with local FBI, Health and Human Services (HHS), and KDHE to review the results, assess the preliminary information, and arrange for additional testing.
VII. Assist the FBI, in conjunction with the CDC, the Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center and KDHE to examine available law enforcement and intelligence information, as well as the technical characteristics and epidemiology of the disease, to determine if there is a possibility of criminal intent.

**153.3.6. Kansas Department of Wildlife, Parks and Tourism (KDWPT)**

I. Surveillance of wildlife
II. Vector control
III. Assists with perimeter control
IV. Coordinates with the Animal Health Commissioner for animal disease response
V. Law enforcement support

**153.3.7. Office of the State Fire Marshal (OSFM)**

I. Coordinates with Hazardous Materials Response Teams, which may provide: cleaning, disinfection and decontamination support
II. Assists with sample collection

**153.3.8. Kansas State University**

I. Assists with initial incident identification
II. Conducts local town hall meetings to educate producers
III. Publishes and distributes educational information
IV. Coordinates with Animal Health Commissioner and the policy group during Animal Disease response incidents
V. Assists with the operation and management of pre-identified temporary animal holding areas
VI. Assists KDA in locating and communicating with producers
VII. Assists KDA with sample collection
VIII. Provides technical expertise
IX. Assists with information collection and distribution
153.3.9. Kansas Department of Transportation

I. Assists in the development and implementation of movement control plans
II. Provides traffic control, as required
III. Supports response operations relative to access controls
IV. Provides guidance about rerouting traffic
V. Assists with public information through Traffic Management Centers (TMCs), 511 phone system, and Digital Message Signs (DMS)
VI. Maintains Kan Road System (www.kanroad.org) to provide updated road conditions to the public

153.3.10. Kansas Forest Service

I. Sample collection and site identification
II. Coordinates with KDA for plant pests and disease
III. Provides educational materials and training to the public
IV. Provides personnel to augment the KDA IMT

153.3.11. Kansas National Guard (KSNG)

Support from the National Guard must be requested through the SEOC and is only available with a Governor’s Declaration of Emergency. Military assistance will complement and not be a substitute for local participation in emergency operations. Military forces will remain at all times under military command, but will support and assist response efforts. Support may be provided in the following areas:

I. Security
II. Cleaning and disinfection
III. Communication
IV. Heavy equipment/operators
V. Movement permit monitoring
VI. Logistical staging areas
VII. Environmental sampling
VIII. Depopulation
IX. Transportation
X. Public information

153.4. Support Functions

Industry associations and organizations within the jurisdiction may assist with a wide variety of tasks based on their capabilities and the capabilities of their members. Some of these tasks include:

I. Communicate with members
II. Assist with state messaging
III. Report issues or concerns to KDA
IV. Assist with locating producers
V. Identify and acquire emergency resources
VI. Provide technical expertise
VII. Provide logistical support
VIII. Report all activities to IMT and SEOC (if activated)
Volunteer agencies, such as the American Red Cross, local church/synagogue congregations, and assistive organizations, such as the Salvation Army, are available to give assistance with sheltering, feeding, and other issues, as necessary.

Assistance from surrounding jurisdictions may be available through the execution of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) or memorandum of agreement (MOA).

Contract personnel may be utilized to fill gaps or to supplement tasks not otherwise identified in this plan.

154. Direction, Control, and Coordination

154.1. Authority to Initiate Actions

This annex may be activated by the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Agriculture, the Animal Health Commissioner (KDA), the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment, or their designees.

154.2. Incident Command System

In the event that local resources are utilized, a local incident command structure may be established and/or a local emergency operations center may be activated. Local medical response teams may be activated in the event of a food emergency. If a disaster affects multiple, widely-separated facilities or jurisdictions, separate incident command operations and an area command may be established. Specific incident command structures and possible variations are discussed in each incident specific appendix.

154.3. Resource Request Process

The IMT will request non-KDA and non-KDHE resources through the KDEM Staff Duty Officer. County Emergency Managers may request resources through KDEM, but all requests will be verified through the IMT. Contact information to the logistics section chief will be posted on WebEOC to enable county emergency managers to request resources directly. The purpose of this change in usual operations is to ensure that decision-makers are involved in the prioritization of scarce resources and that the proper resources are ordered.

154.4. Assistance

If the state resources are insufficient or inappropriate to respond to the emergency situation, a request may be made for assistance from other states or Federal Government. All mission assignments are resource requests will be initiated from the SEOC.

155. Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination

Information managed by the DOC’s, ICP’s and KDEM (or the SEOC if activated) is coordinated through agency representatives located in each facility. DOC and IMT personnel collect information from, analyze
information with, and disseminate information to counterparts in the field. These representatives also disseminate and analyze information within the DOC and ICP that can be used to develop courses of action, manage emergency operations, assign and track agency resources and maintain a common operating picture. This information is shared with stakeholders using WebEOC, Webinars, and liaison personnel located in activated facilities.

Detailed procedures that identify the type of information needed, where it is expected to come from, who uses the information, how the information is shared, the format for providing the information, and specific times the information is needed are maintained in the KDA Information Management SOG.

156. Communications

The KDA and the KDHE maintain agency risk communications plans that would be used in the event of a food or agriculture emergency. These plans contain pre-scripted press releases, talking points, message maps, fact sheets, and templates that may be used to rapidly respond to requests for information and to release information as soon as possible. In the event that the KDA and or/State JIC is activated, these pre-developed tools would form the basis of jointly created messages.

157. Administration, Finance, and Logistics

The Finance/Admin Section Chief is responsible for tracking costs, emergency contracting, time and attendance, coordination with Federal unified command counterparts, and cooperative agreement development and tracking.

158. Annex Development and Maintenance

158.1. Development

This annex was initially developed by a collaborative working group of vested parties, agencies and individuals. Contributions were collectively gathered, revised and included for facilitation of a comprehensive food or agriculture emergency.

158.2. Maintenance

The Kansas Department of Agriculture’s Emergency Management Coordinator will maintain, distribute, and update the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex and its appendices. Responsible officials in State or local agencies should recommend changes and provide updated information in a timely manner (e.g., changes of personnel and available resources). Revisions will be forwarded to people on the distribution list.

Directors of supporting agencies have the responsibility of maintaining internal plans, SOPs, and resource data to ensure prompt and effective response to and recovery from emergencies and disasters.

This annex will also be made available to the public by posting it on the KDA website and attaching it to the Kansas Response Plan, posted on the KDEM website.
158.3. Review and Update

The appendix should be reviewed annually by the team members and stakeholders who worked on the plan development.

The annex and appendices will be updated whenever significant changes need to be published or when the Kansas Planning Standards are revised.
Appendix A – Food Emergency

159. Purpose

It is the purpose of this appendix to define the actions and roles necessary to provide a coordinated response within the state of Kansas to food emergencies. This appendix provides guidance to agencies within the state of Kansas with a general concept of potential emergency assignments before, during, and following emergency situations as they relate to a food-related incident. It also provides for the systematic integration of emergency resources when activated and does not replace county emergency operations plans or the Kansas Response Plan.

160. Scope

This appendix applies to all participating and supporting departments and agencies of the jurisdictions contained within the geographical boundary of the state of Kansas.

The Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) and Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA) are the lead administrative and planning agencies for food integrity and food emergencies within the state of Kansas. KDA and KDHE maintain roles to:

I. Maximize the protection of lives, health and integrity of food supply and distribution.
II. Document procedures to implement when responding to food emergencies.

161. Situation

The primary hazard that this appendix is intended to address is the hazard of intentional or unintentional contamination of a food product or ingredient. The appendix addresses food-related emergencies that involve large numbers of people and multiple jurisdictions. This appendix is not intended to address small-scale incidents that are routinely handled by KDA and KDHE.

162. Planning Assumptions

I. A major food contamination incident would result in severe economic losses and public health consequences. Early detection is critical and encompasses a variety of response actions at all levels of government, industry, producers, and the private sector.
II. Surveillance systems are slowly being developed for food incidents that would detect the presence of radiological, chemical, or biological agents. These systems must be monitored continuously for early detection to be effective. If these systems are triggered, environmental and product sampling should occur along with additional human and animal surveillance to confirm or rule out a case. Additional response to a radiological, chemical, or biological attack would be needed from supporting agencies.
III. Vector/contamination control may require discarding large quantities of food products and ingredients, invoking embargoes or trade restrictions, culling livestock or poultry and identifying alternative sources of food.
IV. A food-related incident, either intentional or not, would likely impact international trade.
V. Food and agriculture incidents do not respect jurisdictional boundaries and would require coordinated efforts between multiple local, tribal, State, regional, national, and international entities. An intentional act against the farm-to-table pathway would likely overwhelm the capabilities of any one entity, further enforcing the need for coordinated efforts.
VI. Public-private partnerships are critical to mitigate any effects of a food or agriculture-related incident.
VII. The receipt of a threat against the food system, in and of itself, could initiate response actions at all levels of government and may result in generating hysteria in the general public.
VIII. Depending on the causative substance of the contamination, contaminated foodstuffs may need to be considered and handled as hazardous waste.
IX. Suspected infected locations, machinery, distribution centers, restaurants, eateries, and transport vehicles may need to be cleaned, disinfected, and reevaluated for contamination.
X. Disruption to food production, distribution and supply within Kansas may have substantial affect to national food supply.
XI. Kansas’ geographic location makes it potentially vulnerable to conditions, disasters, zoonotic disease or other incidents affecting food integrity due to the lack of natural topographic borders and transportation routes that exist in and out of the state.

163. Concept of Operations

As described in the overarching annex, the key elements for an effective response to a food contamination incident include the following: incident identification, incident management, communication and coordination, assessment, control and containment, and recovery.

163.1. Incident Identification

The Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA) and/or Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) and their supporting organizations, through existing surveillance, investigation and inspection efforts monitor steady-state situations for any onset or occurrence of a food emergency. Potential incidents or triggers that may indicate a food emergency are:

I. Any natural or man-made disaster/emergency effecting the integrity of food safety.
II. Suspicious illness or death.
III. Illnesses or deaths where food contamination/adulteration is a likely source as determined by KDHE and/or KDA.
IV. Recall of contaminated products.
V. Formal or informal notification of potential or realized food emergency outside of the jurisdiction that will effect Kansas residents.

KDA and KDHE serve as primary coordination and response agencies for food emergencies. General response operations and/or responsibilities may include:

I. Notification of key investigative partners.
II. Directing and facilitating food inspections based on existing food inspection protocol and food sample collection protocol.
III. Ensure dissemination of food safety information which may include recall information, food handling, public health information, etc.
IV. USDA/ FDA may request effectiveness checks.
V. KDHE will identify any human illness or deaths associated with the contamination and facilitate specimen collection/testing.
VI. KDHE will coordinate with state, regional and federal laboratory partners.
VII. If available the state Rapid Response Team (RRT) will be activated to carry out operational requirements as outlined in IAPs.
VIII. Utilize and/or implement surveillance tools and strategies.
   A. KDHE utilize EMR/EMS system to monitor any increase in symptoms or diseases.
   B. KDHE has internal policies for active case finding surveillance.
   C. Scope and Severity Index used to make determinations in order to prepare for an incident.
IX. KDA conducts routine food manufacturing plant inspections as deemed necessary.

The decision to activate this plan will be made in coordination between KDA and KDHE and communicated via established ESF-8 and/or ESF-11 activation procedures.

I. Activation may be disseminated via existing communication methods such as WebEOC, land lines, email, cell phones, etc.
II. Upon decision to activate this Plan, KDA and KDHE Departmental Operations Centers (DOCs) will notify KDEM of their activations and activation of this appendix.
   A. KDA and KDHE may request that KDEM notify affected or potentially affected jurisdictions of the DOC’s activation. Local EOCs may or may not activate in support of this appendix.
   B. KDA and KDHE may request activation of the SEOC in support of logistical and operational needs outlined within this Plan or specific IAPs.
   C. In the event that county and/or State EOCs are activated, this will be accomplished in accordance with existing levels of activation.
   D. KDHE and KDA maintain an activation matrix, which outlines four levels of scaled response.

163.2. Incident Management

I. Upon realization of a potential food-related incident, the KDA DOC and KDHE DOC will be activated.
   A. KDA would serve as lead agency on incidents involving integrity of food when no human illness has been identified
   B. KDHE would serve as lead agency on incidents where human illness has been identified

II. Upon an unmet need a request will be sent to KDEM (or the SEOC if activated) to meet the need
III. Public information needs will be met via each Departments PIO. PIO’s will operate under existing guidelines and agreements for information collaboration and coordination
IV. DOC chain of command will follow existing organizational structures and guidelines
V. If requested KBI may support local efforts for investigative law enforcement support
VI. Any act suspected as terrorism will be managed by the FBI
VII. It is likely that an act of terrorism will result in a SEOC activation
VIII. As needed, federal partner coordination is managed at a department level (FDA, CDC, USDA, etc.)
IX. Incidents requiring involvement and coordination with private sector and businesses will be coordinated through specific agency Liaison Officers

163.3. Response Actions

General:

I. Information dissemination and investigative support to federal partners
II. Rapid Response Team:
III. Implement Incident Action Plan (IAP) tasks as directed by KDA, KDHE, SEOC and/or federal partners

163.3.1. Basic Plan

I. Trace-back and trace-forward
II. Embargo
III. Recall facilitation
IV. Effectiveness checks
V. Destruction monitoring
VI. Integrity inspections on food facilities (retail, cafeterias, etc.)
VII. Surveillance operations
VIII. Inspections and monitoring of plants and facilities will be prioritized in the event of any suspected or realized contamination
IX. Potential or realized threats may obligate KDA to take prospective inspections on state-licensed plants
X. Any “out of range” findings in finished product dairy samples may obligate sampling at higher frequency and level

163.3.2. Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE)

I. Continuity of health and medical efforts
II. Surge epidemiology and investigative resources and efforts
   A. Task Epidemiology Bureau to help facilitate case definition questionnaires on local and state levels
III. Guidance to health practitioners and providers
IV. Public health lab sample processing
V. Public inquiry management
VI. Surveillance operations
   A. Prospective and active surveillance operations may be activated upon potential threat to Kansas or realized threat in neighboring jurisdiction
   B. Active surveillance measures will be continued throughout operations phase and into recovery

163.3.3. Kansas Division of Emergency Management (KDEM)

I. Activate State EOC, if necessary
II. Activate Joint Information Center, if necessary
III. Logistical support
   A. Transportation
   B. Volunteer management
163.4. Communication and Coordination

I. Utilize existing department communication strategies. Information will be collected and disseminated as appropriate to stakeholders, media, and private sector partners

II. Utilize existing communications networks (i.e., Health Alert Network) to provide updates to responding agencies and relay information back to the EOC and department operations center:
   A. Each department will handle information releases to media
   B. When the SEOC is activated, the JIC may assist with media relations and information releases

III. Establish external communications with counterparts in neighboring jurisdictions through the liaison officer and/or PIO to facilitate situational awareness

IV. Coordinate with local agencies and organizations (Heartland Planning Coalition, National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA), Livestock Association, Restaurant Association, etc.)

V. Federal partners maintain contacts for information dissemination

VI. Facilitate incident management and policy coordination with neighboring jurisdictions

VII. DOC will coordinate with neighboring jurisdictions and other states, if SEOC is not activated

VIII. Coordinate and resolve policy issues between jurisdictions

IX. Establish communications with the private sector. This can be accomplished more efficiently if a public-private partnership has been established

X. Prepare and update basic fact sheets, key messages, and other information materials for distribution to partners, stakeholders, and the public through appropriate established channels

163.5. Assessment, Control, and Containment

163.5.1. General

I. Continue surveillance and assessment

II. Implement surveillance and outbreak investigations to provide continuous monitoring of events

163.5.2. Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA)

I. Processing authority

II. Plant assessment and monitoring

III. Establish quarantine or embargos to mitigate the incident

IV. Guidance on clean slaughter

V. Monitor decontamination and disinfection

VI. Inspect state-licensed and other facilities associated with suspected or confirmed food-borne illness

VII. Conduct trace-backs and trace-forwards to determine the index case and extent of the incident

VIII. Establish movement controls (permitted and non-permitted) of affected products
IX. Product recall refusal action
X. Issue temporary suspension and withdraw inspection
XI. Monitor disposal of contaminated materials to ensure effective recovery of the infrastructure impacted

163.5.3. Kansas Department of Health and Environment/Local Health Department

I. Coordinate collection and submission of food samples for laboratory evaluation and analysis for ongoing surveillance activities to support regulatory actions
II. Coordinate food-borne illness investigations with appropriate food safety officials at the local, State, or Federal level
III. Issue case specific questionnaires to local health departments
IV. Continue public health laboratory testing
V. Public health risk communication
VI. Assess new cases
VII. Send out public health messages to local hospitals and providers
VIII. Work with Bureau of Waste Management regarding disposal of contaminated products
IX. Assess environmental contamination and determine public health risks
X. Report cases or outbreaks of food-borne illness to the State, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)

163.5.4. Kansas Division of Emergency Management (KDEM)

I. Sharing of information with the broader emergency response community
II. Coordinate with state partners for cleanup efforts
III. Support logistical requirements as needed
IV. Coordinate security at movement control areas, quarantined areas, and closed roads.

163.5.5. Private Sector

I. May contribute to voluntary recall assistance by alerting the public sector or consumers
II. May provide logistical support, including transportation services, public information outreach, education etc.

163.6. Recovery Operations

163.6.1. Continued Operations and Transition Requirements

I. KDA may require the development of a Food Defense Plan and heightened surveillance of any and all state-licensed packing and processing plants
II. KDHE will shift focus from investigation efforts to public information campaign and focus on restoring confidence in food products
III. KDHE will continue to assess any new cases and perform epidemiological modeling
IV. KDHE and KDA will shift from active, prospective surveillance activities back to passive surveillance
V. KDA and KDHE may consider activating the Kansas Employee Assistance Program (EAP) to address any critical incident stress issues amongst KDA and KDHE employees

163.6.2. Return to steady-state/normal operations

I. No new cases reported or identified and/or case counts have returned to a base line level
II. After accelerated sampling period is over
III. KDA and KDHE will conduct department specific and unified command After Action Reports (AARs)
IV. Will address any needs for: Education campaigns (lessons learned): internal industry policy, public outreach and preparedness, etc.
V. Remove movement controls on food products and ingredients when possible
VI. Restore essential food production and retail services
VII. Track costs for reimbursement
VIII. Respond to the media and communicate with the public to address concerns and/or rumors
IX. Conduct hazard evaluations to ensure safety of response teams and the public
X. Resolve long-term issues related to pre- and post-harvest food production impacted by the incident
XI. Encourage immediate business recovery
XII. Foster long-term economic recovery
XIII. Identify gaps and initiate repair of response plan

164. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

Both KDA and KDHE have emergency functions in addition to their normal, day-to-day duties. These emergency functions usually parallel or complement normal functions. KDA and KDHE maintain responsibility for developing and maintaining department-specific emergency management procedures and plans.

165. Responsibilities

165.1. Primary Agencies:

165.1.1. Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA)

I. Provides and/or shares overall responsibility and authority for coordinating response for contaminated or adulterated food (see KDHE responsibilities if human illness is involved).
II. Allocates agency resources.
III. Activates KDA Incident Management Team (IMT):
A. Sets overall incident-related priorities
B. Monitors incident response to ensure objectives are met
C. Identifies critical resource needs

IV. Ensures that short term recovery, transitions into full recovery operations.
V. Implements embargos on contaminated products.
VI. Requests voluntary recalls.
VII. Defines affected food supply distribution chains and areas affected in control zones.
VIII. Prepares information for dissemination to the public.
IX. Approves proper procedures to mitigate pathogens in livestock and food facilities.
X. Ensures open, accurate communication to the public and coordinates messaging with all stakeholder groups.

XI. Directs or assists in response actions to include:
   A. Quarantine/embargo
   B. Surveillance
   C. Outbreak investigations
   D. Trace-back and trace-forward
   E. Vector control
   F. Establish movement controls
   G. Chain of custody considerations for contaminated products
   H. Disposal
   I. Product remediation
   J. Destruction
   K. Cleaning and disinfection
   L. Coordinate with existing or alternative laboratories

165.1.2. Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE)

I. Shares lead agency responsibility if the incident involves food products.
II. Coordinate with existing or alternative laboratories.
III. Provides medical guidance information and coordination.
IV. Issues health advisories.
V. Identifies local health facilities, including hospitals, clinics, dialysis centers, and nursing or rehabilitation centers, supplying and using medical and health items.
VI. Identifies at-risk populations, including the elderly and very young, and populations requiring specific life-saving services (e.g., dialysis or assistance with breathing).
VII. Provides vaccination information for the prevention of disease
VIII. Provides public information and education.
IX. Assists in the preparation of technical information as it relates to the environment and possible impacts.
X. Facilitates and guides disposal of contaminated materials.
XI. Manages environmental permitting.
XII. Collects samples and analyzes results.
XIII. Directs or assists in response actions to include:
   A. Outbreak investigations
   B. Surveillance
   C. Quarantine/isolation
165.1.3. Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI)

I. Conducts criminal investigations.
II. Collects and processes evidence.
III. Assists FBI with terrorist investigations.

165.1.4. Office of the State Fire Marshal (OSFM)

I. Coordinates with Hazardous Materials Response Teams, which may provide:
   - cleaning, disinfection and decontamination.
II. Assists with sample collection.

165.1.5. Kansas State University

I. Assists with initial incident identification.
II. Conducts local town hall meetings.
III. Publishes and distributes educational information.
IV. Provides technical expertise.
V. Assists with information collection and distribution.

165.1.6. Private Sector (Food Firms)

I. Public information dissemination.
II. Product tracking.

165.2. Support Functions

The overarching Food and Agriculture Annex describes the various support functions that may be available from state and local agencies. Some resources are only available when the State EOC is activated (e.g. KSNG). Support from other State government departments and agencies may be made available in accordance with the Kansas Response Plan.

Industry associations and organizations within the jurisdiction may assist with a wide variety of tasks based on their capabilities and the capabilities of their members. Some of these tasks include:

I. Communicate with members
II. Assist with state messaging
III. Report issues or concerns to KDA
IV. Assist with locating producers
V. Identify and acquire emergency resources
VI. Provide technical expertise
VII. Provide logistical support

165.2.1. Local jurisdiction support

Local health department support:

I. Activation of Medical Reserve Corps, if necessary
II. Local surveillance and epidemiology function
III. Local public information and education
166. Direction, Control, and Coordination

Authority to Initiate Actions:

I. The Secretary of Agriculture and Secretary of Health and Environment, or designees, maintain direct authority to activate this Plan

II. Operational Responsibility and formation of the Incident Management Team(s) will be tasked to the Emergency Management Coordinator for each respective agency

167. Information Collection and Dissemination

Disaster information managed by the state of Kansas is coordinated through agency representatives located in the EOC. These representatives collect information from and disseminate information to counterparts in the field. These representatives also disseminate information within the EOC that can be used to develop courses of action, manage emergency operations, and maintain a common operating picture.

Detailed procedures that identify the type of information needed, where it is expected to come from, who uses the information, how the information is shared, the format for providing the information, and specific times the information is needed are maintained at the Kansas Department of Agriculture, Kansas Department of Health and Environment and/or Kansas Division of Emergency Management.

This Annex will be maintained and disseminated as appropriate via KDA and KDHE officials, as directed by internal communications and training procedures. This annex will also be made available to the public.

168. Communications

Communication protocols and coordination procedures for KDA are described in detail in the KDA Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Guide. Please refer to this plan for additional information.

Communication protocols and coordination procedures for KDHE are described in detail in the KDHE ESF-8 Crisis and Emergency Communication Plan. Please refer to this plan for additional information.

169. Administration, Finance, and Logistics

MOUs with adjoining counties or local governments recognize that certain situations require effective coordination and cooperation between jurisdictions to achieve effective response and provide for the general safety and health of residents. These documents formalize and focus attention on commitments and help avoid misunderstandings.

170. Authorities and References

170.1. Federal
• 21 C.F.R. Part 100 thru 186 excluding 100.1 and 100.2

170.2. State

• Kansas Statutes Concerning the Division of Food Safety and Lodging and powers Granted Thereto, K.S.A. 74-581 through K.S.A. 74-5,111.
• Food Drug and Cosmetic Act K.S.A. 65-619 et seq.
• Food Service and Lodging Act K.S.A. 36-501 et seq.
• Lodging Establishment Regulations K.A.R. 4-27-1 through 4-27-22.

170.3. Other

• KDA/KDHE Memorandum of Understanding regarding Foodborne illness outbreak investigations.
Appendix B – Plant Health Emergency

171. Purpose
The purpose of this appendix is to define the actions and roles necessary to provide a coordinated plant health emergency response within the state of Kansas. This appendix provides guidance to Kansas agencies with a general concept of potential emergency assignments before, during, and following emergency situations as they relate to a plant health–related incident. It also provides for the systematic integration of emergency resources when activated and does not replace existing state or county emergency operations plans or procedures.

172. Scope
The appendix applies to all plant health emergencies that occur in the state of Kansas. Most plant emergencies involve the USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine service and involve multiple states. State authority for plant health incidents is vested with the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Agriculture and the State Plant Regulatory Official (SPRO). The SPRO in Kansas is the program manager for the Plant Protection and Weed Control program. Some plant health emergencies are limited to a few vendors, while others can affect crops and international trade.

173. Situation Overview

173.1. Planning Assumptions

I. Using exotic plant diseases and pests or other means to attack or to threaten an attack on the farm-to-table pathway would result in severe economic losses and public health consequences. Early detection is critical and encompasses a variety of response actions at all levels of government, industry, producers, and the private sector.

II. Surveillance systems are slowly being developed for plant health incidents that would detect the presence of radiological, chemical, or biological agents. These systems must be monitored continuously for early detection to be effective. If these systems are triggered, environmental and product sampling should occur along with additional human and animal surveillance to confirm or rule out a case. Additional response to a radiological, chemical, or biological attack would be needed from supporting agencies.

III. Vector/contamination control may require discarding large quantities of agricultural products, invoking embargoes or trade restrictions, destroying large quantities of crops, rangelands, forest and timberlands, and nursery products. It may also require identifying alternative sources of food.

IV. A plant health incident, either intentional or not, would likely impact international trade.

V. Plant health incidents do not respect jurisdictional boundaries and would require coordinated efforts between multiple local, tribal, State, regional, National, and international entities. An intentional act against the farm-to-table pathway would likely
overwhelm the capabilities of any one entity, further enforcing the need for coordinated efforts.

VI. Public-private partnerships are critical to mitigate any effects of a plant health-related incident.

VII. The receipt of a threat against the agricultural community, in and of itself, could initiate response actions at all levels of government and may result in hysteria of the general public.

VIII. Depending on the causative substance of the contamination, contaminated crops, grains, fruits, vegetables, nuts, timber and nursery products, and feedstuffs may need to be considered and handled as hazardous waste.

IX. Suspected infected locations, machinery, distribution centers, farms, nurseries, and transport vehicles may need to be cleaned, disinfected, and reevaluated for contamination.

X. Weather related factors may greatly influence the scope and duration of an event.

174. Concept of Operations

174.1. General

As described in the overarching annex, the key elements for an effective response to a plant health incident include the following: incident identification, incident management, defining response actions, communication and coordination, assessment, control and containment, and recovery. The “Define Response Actions” is an additional element that applies to early decisions made in response to a plant health emergency.

174.2. Incident Identification

Possible threats and hazards that may lead to a response to a plant health incident may come from:

I. United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS) Plant Select Agent List

II. Watch List of plant pests in Kansas agricultural crops, plantings, and native plants

III. Unknown or emerging pests in Kansas agricultural crops, plantings, and native plants

Detection of a potential hazard from one of the items listed previously will initiate collection of the official sample.

A plant health incident is determined by a laboratory confirmation of an official sample collected under a chain of custody. A defined plant health incident requires activation of this plan.

Response actions to address an incident will be specific to the pest but may include:

I. Surveillance

II. Quarantine

III. Seizure

IV. Eradication

V. Destruction

VI. Disposal
VII. Monitor surveillance strategies to identify observations that could indicate an incident has occurred or has the potential to occur.

VIII. Follow established guidelines for notifying State and Federal contacts when certain criteria are met.

174.3. Incident Management

I. The Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA) Incident Management Team will be activated at the request of the State Plant Regulatory Official (SPRO).

II. The KDA Incident Management Team will be staffed with personnel from KDA, USDA, Kansas State University, and other agencies as deemed appropriate.

III. A liaison from KDEM will be requested if the SEOC is not activated.

IV. The State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) may be activated if additional resources are needed. The SEOC will serve as the multi-agency coordination center when this plan is activated.

V. An agency JIC may be established.

VI. When appropriate other Federal partners will be included in the response.

A. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—Intentional acts

B. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—Environmental impact

C. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—Regulated feed and food

D. Others

174.4. Response Actions

I. Define end goal, mission, and/or desired outcomes.

II. Determine the need and composition of the subject matter expert board.

III. Determine Response actions based on Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG). Actions taken to address an incident will be specific to the pest but may include:

A. Surveillance

B. Quarantine and movement controls

C. Eradication

D. Destruction

E. Disposal

F. Trace-forward and trace-back

G. Return to origin

H. Seizure

I. Treatment

J. Other steps necessary to prevent the spread of the threat

IV. Conduct hazard evaluations to ensure safety of response teams and the public.

V. Develop plant pest incident action plans based on response guidelines or other documentation.

VI. Identify applicable SOGs.

VII. Determine whether a criminal investigation into the plant health incident is warranted.

174.5. Communication and Coordination

I. Implement communication strategies and plans, including activation of agency JIC.
II. Use existing communications networks to provide updates to responding agencies and relay information back to the DOC and the SEOC (if activated).

III. Establish external communications with counterparts in neighboring jurisdictions to ensure:
   A. Policy coordination and resolution
   B. Regular updates
   C. Establishment of Priorities
   D. Coordination of public information

IV. Acquire and allocate resources required by incident management personnel in concert with incident command.

V. Establish communications with the private sector.

VI. Prepare and update basic fact sheets, key messages, and other information materials for distribution to partners, stakeholders, and the public through appropriate established channels.

VII. Use the Joint Information System (JIS) to coordinate media releases with elected officials, emergency management, other State and Federal agencies, trade associations, and the private sector.

VIII. Respond to the media and communicate with the public to address concerns and/or rumors.

174.6. Assessment, Control, and Containment

174.6.1. Assessment

I. Conduct hazard evaluations to ensure safety of response teams and the public.

II. Conduct delimiting surveys and outbreak investigations to define the affected area.

III. Conduct trace-backs and trace-forwards to determine the index case and extent of the plant disease outbreak.

IV. Coordinate plant disease investigations with appropriate officials at the local, State, or Federal level.

V. Convene the board of subject matter experts.

VI. Collect samples of products and conduct sample analysis.

VII. Determine public health risks from diseased or adulterated plant products.

VIII. Evaluate economic implications and consequences.

IX. Conduct evidence gathering for a criminal investigation.

X. Assess environmental contamination.

174.6.2. Control and Containment

I. Request product recalls on plant products.

II. Conduct disposal of contaminated materials to ensure effective recovery of the impacted infrastructure.

III. Conduct decontamination and disinfection.

IV. Establish quarantine or embargos to mitigate the plant health incident.

V. Establish movement controls (permitted and non-permitted) of affected products.

VI. Provide security at movement control areas, quarantined areas and closed roads.

VII. Provide public education on affected products.
VIII. Report cases of plant pests to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), if human health impact is suspected.

174.7. Recovery

I. Establish recovery planning team early in the response phase to facilitate restoration of plant production and transportation services.
II. Determine what continued surveillance is needed and the timeline.
III. Determine the conditions under which recovery would be complete.
IV. Evaluate quarantine and movement controls of regulated articles, and remove when possible.
V. Conduct hazard evaluations to ensure safety of response teams and the public.
VI. Determine when personnel and equipment will be demobilized.
VII. Resolve long-term issues related to pre- and post-harvest plant production impacted by the incident.
VIII. Assist in timely business recovery, and facilitate long-term economic recovery.
IX. Identify gaps and update response plan if necessary.

175. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

175.1. General

Most government departments and agencies have emergency functions in addition to their normal, day-to-day duties. These emergency functions usually parallel or complement normal functions. Each department/agency is responsible for developing and maintaining its own emergency management procedures.

175.2. Assignment of Responsibilities

175.2.1. Kansas Department of Agriculture (KDA)

I. Provides overall responsibility and authority for coordinating response.
II. Notifies and includes USDA-APHIS when necessary.
III. Allocates agency resources.
IV. Activates KDA Incident Management Team (IMT).
V. Sets overall incident-related priorities.
VI. Monitors incident response to ensure objectives are met.
VII. Identifies critical resource needs.
VIII. Defines affected areas and control zones.
IX. Prepares information for dissemination to the public.
X. Ensures all messages are coordinated with stakeholders.
XI. Approves the use of pesticides to mitigate pathogens and other plant pests.
XII. Directs or assists in response actions.
XIII. Coordinates with land management agencies.
XIV. Convene recovery planning team.
175.2.2. Kansas State University

I. Assists with initial incident identification.
II. Conducts local town hall meetings to educate producers.
III. Publishes and distributes educational information.
IV. Assists KDA in locating producers.
V. Assists KDA with sample collection.
VI. Provides technical expertise.
VII. Assists with information collection and distribution.

175.2.3. Kansas Forest Service

I. Sample collection and site identification.
II. Coordinates with KDA for plant pests and disease.
III. Provides educational materials and training to the public.

175.2.4. Laboratories

I. Provides diagnostic testing of samples.
II. Coordinates information and data sharing.
III. Provides timely reports of laboratory results.
IV. Maintains chain-of-custody where and when needed.
V. Provides sample collection guidance to field investigators.

175.2.5. Support Functions

I. USDA-APHIS-PPQ is the lead Federal agency to provide support in implementing this plan depending on the nature of the event.
II. Support from other Federal agencies may also be provided.
III. Support from other State agencies may be requested through KDEM or the SEOC (if activated). The resources of these agencies will complement and not be a substitute for local participation in emergency operations:
   A. Security
   B. Cleaning and disinfection
   C. Communication
   D. Heavy equipment/operators
   E. Permit monitoring
   F. Logistical staging areas
   G. Environmental sampling and monitoring
   H. Assist with surveillance activities
   I. Transportation
   J. Public information

IV. Industry associations and organizations may assist with a wide variety of tasks based on their capabilities and the capabilities of their members. Some of these tasks include:
   A. Communicate with members
B. Assist with State messaging  
C. Report issues or concerns to KDA  
D. Assist with locating businesses and producers  
E. Identify and acquire emergency resources  
F. Provide technical expertise  
G. Provide logistical support  
H. Provide additional surveillance capacity  
I. Provide advocacy  

V.  
VI. Assistance from surrounding States may be available through the execution of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) or memorandum of agreement (MOA)  
VII. Contract personnel may be utilized to fill gaps or to supplement tasks not otherwise identified in this plan  

176. Authorities and References  

Federal  

- Plant Protection Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-224, June 20, 2000).  
- Agriculture Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188).  

State  

- Kansas Black Stem Rust Act (K.S.A. 2-712 et seq.).  
- Kansas Tree and Shrubbery Law  

Other Agreements  

- KDA/USDA-APHIS-PPQ General Memorandum of Understanding.  
- KDA/USDA-APHIS-PPQ Post Entry Quarantine Memorandum of Understanding.  
- KDA/USDA-APHIS-PPQ Biotechnology Regulatory Service Memorandum of Understanding.  
- KDA/USDA-APHIS-PPQ Export Certification Memorandum of Understanding.
Appendix C – Livestock Emergency

177. Purpose
The purpose of this appendix is to describe the roles and responsibilities of various agencies during disease outbreaks involving livestock. This plan applies to outbreaks that require swift intervention by the KDA and USDA with support from other state and federal resources. When used in this appendix “KDA” refers to the Division of Animal Health and other KDA employees who will work under the direction and control of the Animal Health Commissioner or the Secretary.

178. Scope
This appendix is intended to be scalable and will be used to describe the response to any livestock disease that is reported that requires an extraordinary response by the Kansas Department of Agriculture. In the event of an outbreak of a Foreign Animal Disease, many additional resources would be required and the State EOC will be activated. This appendix will describe actions for the various responses that would be required by all potential responders.

There are many livestock diseases that will require a coordinated response from the KDA and the USDA. Both agencies have limited staff and resources and will need to collaborate with local and state partners in order to respond in an efficient and rapid manner. Disease outbreaks in bordering states often initiate a response in Kansas due to producer and public concerns regarding the outbreak and Kansas herd susceptibility. Attachment 1 lists the various diseases that may initiate the activation of this plan.

179. Situation
Animal disease outbreaks have the potential to affect livestock and wildlife that could result in grave economic consequences for Kansas and the nation. The impact of an outbreak of this type would directly affect farmers and ranchers and, with time, will affect most agriculture related industries and consumers. Extraordinary response measures may be required to effectively control the spread of highly infectious diseases including quarantine, movement control, and animal disposal measures. Response procedures are likely to extend across state lines and require a coordinated national and international response.

An incident of this nature is the exception to the implicit disaster management rule that local governments have ultimate control of response operations with the support from state and federal counterparts. Unlike natural disasters such as floods and tornadoes, the response of the Federal government is required from the onset. A FAD Secretarial disaster declaration by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) which provides federal funding for response and recovery actions in animal health incidents will be triggered exclusively after official USDA laboratory testing, reinforced by other epidemiological information, indicates conclusively the presence of a FAD in the United States.
The US Department of Homeland Security has determined that while the nation is deemed to be at risk of some type of terrorist threat, the first confirmed positive (Index) case of a FAD in the nation is to be treated as a terrorism incident until proven otherwise. Such an incident will generate immediate and appropriate local, state, and national measures to eliminate the crisis and minimize consequences.

The extent and speed of the outbreak will determine the confirmation process to be followed in order to expedite stop movement and eradication procedures. A slow moving outbreak will allow normal testing procedures to be conducted. A fast moving or widespread outbreak may require cases to be confirmed through clinical signs only.

180. Planning Assumptions

I. Using contagious animal diseases or other means to attack, or to threaten an attack on the farm-to-table pathway would result in severe economic losses and public health consequences. Early detection is critical and encompasses a variety of response actions at all levels of government, industry, producers, and the private sector.

II. Surveillance systems are slowly being developed for livestock and poultry incidents that would detect the presence of radiological, chemical, or biological agents. These systems must be monitored continuously for early detection to be effective. If these systems are triggered, environmental and product sampling should occur along with additional human and animal surveillance to confirm or rule out a case. Additional response to a radiological, chemical, or biological attack would be needed from supporting agencies.

III. Vector/contamination control may require discarding large quantities of agricultural products and organic matter, invoking embargoes or trade restrictions, culling livestock or poultry, and identifying alternative sources of food.

IV. A livestock or poultry incident, either intentional or not, would likely impact international trade.

V. Livestock and poultry incidents do not respect jurisdictional boundaries and would require coordinated efforts between multiple local, tribal, State, regional, national and international entities. An intentional introduction of disease to livestock or poultry would likely overwhelm the capabilities of any one entity, further enforcing the need for coordinated efforts.

VI. Public-private partnerships are critical to mitigate any effects of a livestock or poultry-related incident.

VII. The receipt of a threat against the agricultural community, in and of itself, could initiate response actions at all levels of government and may result in generating hysteria in the general public.

VIII. Depending on the causative substance of the contamination, contaminated feed, manure, livestock or poultry may need to be considered and handled as hazardous waste.

IX. Suspected infected locations, machinery, distribution centers, farms, ranches, and transport vehicles may need to be cleaned, disinfected, and re-evaluated for contamination.

X. Local and State authorities will likely not have the resources for all operations and activities involved in a large-scale, livestock or poultry disease response. Assistance will be needed from the local, State and Federal agencies not typically associated with agriculture to help control and eradicate a contagious livestock or poultry disease.

XI. Federal law enforcement will be the lead agency for a criminal investigation if the incident is determined to be an intentional or criminal act.
XII. Foreign animal diseases may be infectious and contagious affecting livestock, poultry, and wildlife. Identification, isolation, control and eradication of a foreign animal disease may be difficult and may also have the ability to spread to livestock, poultry, or other animals in other states and countries.

XIII. Delays in identifying a foreign animal disease outbreak could result in a long-term and costly implementation of control measures, as well as responder deployment for up to six months or longer.

XIV. Animal diseases have the ability to be transported over large distances (e.g. vehicles, humans, animals, environmental) and can be viable for long periods of time on the surface of many objects, such as fences, roads, animal feed and farm equipment.

XV. Highly contagious foreign animal diseases may spread quickly. Taking immediate actions, such as establishing containment and quarantine zones, implementing agriculture movement controls, or restricting interstate movement are effective ways to stop the spread of the disease.

XVI. Some foreign animal diseases may be very slow moving (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [BSE]). Slow moving disease may be detrimental to animals, the economy, and people, but sometimes the best response may require slow methodical surveillance and investigation to determine the source of the disease and the best way to eradicate it. These types of responses may not need the employment of large numbers of personnel and resources.

XVII. Management of a foreign animal disease may require heightened coordination with USDA.

XVIII. A zoonotic disease response will require coordination between KDA and KDHE in conjunction with USDA and CDC.

181. Concept of Operations

181.1. General

Animal health emergencies are within the statutory authority and mandate of the Kansas Department of Agriculture.

As the lead agency, KDA under the direction of the Animal Health Commissioner in partnership with the USDA will direct all animal disease investigation, surveillance, movement control, diagnostic, biosecurity, animal depopulation, vaccination, carcass disposal, cleaning/disinfection and recovery activities. Response and recovery activities will be consistent with the established emergency response and recovery protocols of units of local government and with the State of Kansas. This is contrary to the typical hierarchy of authority and responsibility for disaster and emergency response.

KDA is also responsible for developing disease control plans, procedures and strategies, controlling the disposition of abandoned, disabled, or dead animals, and managing the consequences from an act of agro-terrorism. If required, KDA will facilitate the relocation of animals from risk areas and provide other technical assistance as required.

The primary and support agencies will coordinate through KDEM and County(s) Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs). An Incident Command Post (ICP) will be established at the KDA Headquarters in Manhattan to ensure the most effective response and use of personnel and equipment. Technical experts may also be collocated with the Incident Management Team at the ICP to ensure coordination.
This plan recognizes certain catastrophic events related to animals as events requiring activation of the state emergency operations plan. This plan also supports the control efforts of public health agencies in controlling zoonotic diseases and law enforcement agencies investigating acts of agro-terrorism.

As described in the overarching annex, the key elements for an effective response to an animal disease incident include the following: incident identification, incident management, communication and coordination, assessment, control and containment, and recovery.

181.2. Incident Identification

Animal disease incidents may come to the attention of state and/or federal agencies in a variety of ways. Traditionally, a local producer notices signs that livestock are sick and the local veterinarian is notified. Some incidents start in other states and USDA notifies the states with information about the outbreak. Laboratories may report incidents to the Animal Health Commissioner. The media may report on disease outbreaks prior to USDA notification. Rumors of some diseases can also initiate a rapid response to rule out the rumor and to ease public fears.

For reportable diseases that require an extraordinary response from KDA, the Incident Management Team would be activated. Field teams and task forces may be deployed to affected areas. For incidents identified in other states, the Animal Health Commissioner may activate the IMT to organize KDA and USDA resources and begin preparing for a response. Border restrictions may be enacted, which could result in the need for a state disaster declaration and the activation of the SEOC.

The flow chart provided below shows how a specific FAD incident (Foot and Mouth Disease, FMD) that starts in Kansas would be identified and the steps taken to respond. It is important to point out that not all FAD events are alike. The severity and response activities depend on many factors. Since FMD would be the most economically devastating disease in Kansas, it is the one we plan for. If we are able to respond to FMD, the plans and standard operating guides we have developed should be scalable to allow a lesser response to another disease situation.
Presumptive (+)

- Confirmatory Results from FADDL
  - Negative (-)
    - Investigation Closed
  - Positive (+)
    - State Declaration Issued
      - CO Declaration
      - Partial Activation of SEOC
    - KDA Incident Management Team Activated
      - Staff IMT and Deploy Field Strike teams and task forces
        - Secure Quarantine Zone
      - Response Activities
      - Invite KDEM Liaison
        - Surveillance and Epidemiology
        - Determine Eradication Methodology
          - Vaccination (to kill or live)
          - Euthanasia
          - Appraisal, burial, indemnity

KAHC convenes small planning team while awaiting confirmation

- Plan State Declaration
- Prepare Public Information
- Prepare to initiate enforced quarantine zone

The following team shall be called:
  - KDA Exec Team, AH Staff, Dairy, M & P, USDA, KDEM, CO EM, KHP OPS, KDOT OPS, TAG, GOV OFC, and Marketing Team

All activities will be managed by
the ICP – Operations Section
181.3. Incident Management

Any incident that begins to stretch the resources of the KDA Division of Animal Health can result in the activation of the KDA Incident Management Team. The purpose of the team is to utilize all available KDA resources to assist any division in responding to incidents that overwhelm their programs and personnel.

There are many program diseases that may require an extraordinary response from KDA and USDA that would not necessitate a Governor’s declaration of emergency. In these events, the KDA IMT would activate and take direction from the Animal Health Commissioner regarding response activities. KDEM would be notified and invited to send a liaison to the ICP. Incident Action Plans and Situation Reports would be prepared and shared with all relevant stakeholders. County emergency managers would be notified when a response is occurring in their county.

The KDA IMT uses a strict ICS structure and will follow the principles of ICS to direct the response and associated logistics. The IC will be the Animal Health Commissioner or his designee. The Operations Section Chief will be a veterinarian or other professional staff from the Division of Animal Health. Other positions may or may not be staffed with DAH employees since other KDA program staff are trained and are capable of serving in those positions. It is likely that DAH field staff will be needed to support field operations (surveillance, etc.). Regional IMT teams may be asked to provide team members to augment field operations if they are available.

It is a KDA policy that the Animal Health Commissioner has access to any KDA staff that he needs in order to respond to animal disease incident. Those personnel assigned to the incident will be assigned to the Division of Animal Health until demobilized by the Animal Health Commissioner.

Once state resources are needed that are not under the control of KDA and USDA, it will be up to the Adjutant General to determine if and when the SEOC is activated. This may occur with or without a Governor’s declaration. The decision will be based on the scope of the incident and the resources and authorities needed.

Activation of the SEOC will be as follows:

Normal Operations / Steady State (Level 4): Routine monitoring of jurisdictional situation (no event or incident anticipated). The EOC is not staffed.

Enhanced Steady-State (Level 3): A situation or threat has developed and requires monitoring and coordination between jurisdictions and agencies resulting in a partially staffed center. The EOC is staffed with a few personnel focused on situational awareness.

Partial (Level 2): A response where a situation or threat has developed requiring coordination beyond the normal workday and that requires 24/7 monitoring. The EOC
is partially staffed to include limited or partial liaison support based on the needs of the incident.

**Full (Level 1):** An incident of such magnitude that it requires or may require extensive response and recovery efforts and very significant resources or a situation/threat has developed, requiring 24/7 coordination, monitoring, and support. The EOC has staff all general positions including applicable liaison positions and operations are being conducted on a 24 hour basis.

The SEOC will be activated as described above based on the requirements of the incident. The Secretary of KDA will appoint designee to serve in the SEOC policy group.

### 181.3.1. Resource Request Process

All resources requested to support a response to FAD incident will be funneled through the KDA Incident Command Post. The Logistics Section Chief (LSC) will determine the validity of the request and make all efforts to fulfill valid requests. If the LSC is unable to obtain the requested resource locally, the request is sent to the Logistics Section in the State Emergency Operations Center. Requests made directly to the SEOC will be validated and approved by the LSC in the KDA ICP or the approval may be delegated to the KDA Liaison located in the SEOC. Policies and procedures for local resource procurement will be sent out within the first 2 operational periods, detailing the limits on local spending and record-keeping.

### 181.4. Assessment, Control, and Containment

#### 181.4.1. Diagnosis

Most local practitioners have limited or no first-hand experience in the clinical diagnosis of FAD. Symptoms are often unfamiliar to local practitioners and show an unusually high morbidity or mortality rate. Discovery of a suspect case requires immediate notification to the Animal Health Commissioner or USDA for sample collection and expedited transportation to the NVSL. A suspect case, where an animal shows clinical signs that appear consistent with a FAD, requires strict reporting and monitoring measures to be implemented. KDA will deploy a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) to the site soon after the initial report from a local veterinarian is received. A FAD investigation, including required laboratory testing, will be conducted in an accelerated manner based on observations of the FADD.

As part of the investigation, the FADD will determine the likelihood of a highly contagious disease. Their determination will help classify the case as “low suspicion,” “intermediate suspicion,” or “high suspicion.” At a minimum, the FADD may quarantine the suspect site until laboratory results rule out a FAD during which time a state quarantine of the site may be implemented, in particular if:

I. Presence of a FAD is suspected or has been confirmed in the United States
II. A credible terrorist threat to livestock in Kansas or anywhere in the nation has been received

When a case is classified as “high suspicion,” the FADD will notify and consult with the APHIS Area Director (AD) and the Animal Health Commissioner. Samples submitted to an approved
laboratory are treated as “Priority 1” to ensure that a presumptive diagnosis is reached within 24 hours or less.

181.4.2. Notification

Based on consultation between the FADD, Animal Health Commissioner, and the USDA AD and having had a previous confirmation of a FAD in the US, all required response and notification measures are to be taken.

I. A State quarantine will be placed on the premises (now labeled “infected premises or IP”)
II. The Animal Health Commissioner notifies KDA Executive Team and KDA Emergency Manager
III. The KDA Secretary notifies the Governor
IV. The KDA Emergency Manager notifies KDEM
V. All follow-up notification procedures will be implemented in accordance with the KDA Notification SOG
VI. The Governor shall issue a proclamation with the details of the quarantine area and sanitary measures as defined by the Animal Health Commissioner

KDEM may activate the SEOC to the level required by the incident and assist by coordinating response activities with local emergency management officials in support of KDA. TAG, as Director of KDEM, will advise the Governor of support requirements. The Governor may exercise his/her authority in declaring a State Disaster. Upon such declaration, TAG may direct any and all agencies of State government to provide assistance under the policies and structures of the Kansas Response Plan. KDEM will coordinate with FEMA and DHS if there is a Stafford Act Declaration.

181.5. Quarantine

The Animal Health Commissioner has the authority to order any quarantine and/or sanitary measures necessary to control potential outbreaks of disease in animals and has the authority to direct County Sheriffs to implement prescribed quarantine measures. The quarantine carries a Class A Misdemeanor violation penalty on the first conviction. Subsequent convictions are a Class D Felony.

The Animal Health Commissioner is authorized under Kansas law to order confiscation and disposal of any infected or exposed animals. Preparations may be made to quarantine areas where suspect or confirmed cases may have originated and may require special operational procedures.

181.6. Tracing

Tracing will play an important role in identifying disease spread. Tracing may include but is not limited to:

I. Livestock
II. Animal products: meat, offal, meal, wool, skins, hides, semen, and embryos
III. Vehicles: milk tankers, livestock, transport vehicles, feed trucks, visitors’ cars
IV. Materials: hay, straw, crops and grains
V. People: veterinarians, task force members, sales and feed representatives, technicians, producers, and visitors

Tracing may also include inspection of stock, investigation of reports of suspect disease, and a serological survey. The level and direction of surveillance will be driven by the epidemiological information being collected.

Trace-backs should be applied for a minimum of two times the maximum incubation period before the onset of clinical signs. Trace-forwards should be applied up to the time the quarantine is imposed.

181.7. Animal Movement

The Kansas Animal Health Commissioner, under the Governor’s authority, may issue a stop movement order. Under such an order, Kansas Law Enforcement will stop movement of livestock and livestock related equipment and traffic throughout Kansas. The intent of the stop movement order is to contain the spread of the disease and to contain the pathogen of concern.

A stop movement order will be issued at any time after Foot and Mouth Disease is announced anywhere in North America. A presumptive positive case of FMD in North America automatically triggers an order. The stop movement order may be issued for other Foreign Animal Diseases, but FMD automatically triggers the order. The Animal Health Commissioner will conduct a risk analysis to determine the necessity of movement orders and locations of checkpoints. Kansas officials have been working with border-states to pre-identify checkpoint locations near the borders and these may be activated prior to any identification of disease in Kansas.

Emergency movement permits are official documents to be completed by law enforcement officers at check-points and issued to livestock haulers and other affected transits. Movement permits will determine which one of the three destinations below best fits each transport depending on the risk of spreading the disease:

I. Return to their point of origin unless they have come through an infected/quarantine area or unless they would have to go through an infected area to return to that point of origin.

II. Continue to destination only if slaughterhouses and other facilities are still accepting livestock, but not if they have come through an infected/quarantine area or would have to go through an infected area to proceed to destination.

III. Divert (and escort) to pre-selected County diverted holding sites for unloading and disease surveillance, but not through an infected/quarantine area. This applies to any livestock or other affected transits that cannot return to point of origin or proceed to destination.

If the Animal Health Commissioner issues a Stop Movement Order, a designated time will be listed when NO conveyances hauling susceptible species may enter or move within the state of Kansas. The order will be in effect until it is revoked or revised by the Animal Health Commissioner. In order to move susceptible species, a permit will have to be issued from the KDA. Permits will only be granted for necessary, low/no risk movements. Permits will be
shared with all law enforcement and any driver hauling susceptible species in Kansas must have a valid permit to transport. Failure to obtain a permit may result in imprisonment.

181.8. **Euthanasia**

Animals will be treated humanely from the time they are identified as presumptive or confirmed positive until they are euthanized. Euthanasia must be performed as rapidly and humanely as possible by chemical or mechanical means. Response efforts will encompass depopulation of non-domesticated animals that are susceptible or possible carriers of the FAD (e.g., deer, elk, etc.).

181.9. **Disposal**

Eradication of the disease will require proper sanitation and disposal procedures for carcasses. The KDHE Bureau of Waste Management (BWM) has published technical guidance titled “Disposal Options for Large Quantities of Dead Animals.” This guidance covers acceptable practices for disposal of large quantities of dead animals.

Depending on the disease, KDA and KDHE will determine which option for disposal will be chosen:

I. Rendering
II. Composting
III. Disposal at a municipal solid waste landfill
IV. Burial on-site
V. Incineration or open burning

Numerous factors will determine the feasibility of using a site for burial or composting. The KDHE Bureau of Waste Management will work closely with KDA to determine an acceptable site using the best available information. Consideration will be given to preventing the creation of hazards for human or animal health and the environment. Long term care of the disposal area will also be considered.

Milk from diseased animals will be disposed by land application and immediate incorporation or direct injection into the soil. BWM will help determine the most acceptable disposal areas and the amount of property needed. Milk from non-diseased animals may also have to be disposed of until movement restrictions are adjusted to allow for milk to be transported to processing.

181.10. **Biosecurity**

Procedures to prevent the spread of highly infectious disease agents to susceptible species will be implemented within 24-hours of the first presumptive positive premises identification. The FADD will observe proper biosecurity protocols and direct that all responders and visitors to the premises follow appropriate procedures.

181.11. **Surveillance**

The objectives of surveillance are to:
I. Detect infected premises during an outbreak
II. Determine the size and extent of the outbreak
III. Supply information to evaluate outbreak control activities
IV. Provide information for animal and product movement within the Control area
V. Provide information for animal and product movement out of the Control area
VI. Prove disease freedom and regain disease-free status after the eradication of the outbreak
VII. Surveillance within the buffer zone will initially be performed via visual inspection of livestock or poultry. Surveillance of suspect premises (those premises in a buffer zone that have susceptible animals that have a possible role in the spread of the agent) will include laboratory testing of susceptible animals.

Surveillance within the surveillance zone will include slaughter surveillance, serological surveys, and investigation of reports of suspect disease. It will include livestock and poultry facilities and susceptible wildlife populations if present. The level and direction of surveillance will be driven by epidemiological information being collected.

Surveillance outside the quarantine area will be accomplished by slaughter surveillance, serological surveys, and investigation of reports of suspect disease.

Surveillance during an outbreak will be coordinated to optimize available resources. Veterinary Services will coordinate national surveillance activities from national or regional operational centers. KDA will manage state surveillance activities from the Incident Command Post in Manhattan. Survey teams and sampling teams will be dispatched out of the Operations Section. KDEM will manage state agency resources and coordination at the SEOC. On-site coordination will be led by the FADD or other appropriate official. The CEOC will provide support to local operations and will provide information to the SEOC and the KDA ICP.

Intervals between inspections will depend on the observed incubation period of the highly contagious diseases, available resources, and risk of exposure to susceptible animals.

Suspect premises without reported clinical illness should be inspected at least three times during each incubation period. Every effort must be made to educate producers about clinical signs and to report symptoms consistent with disease presentation.

A surveillance plan for wildlife will be implemented to determine if the agent is in that population.

181.12. Wildlife Surveillance
Immediately upon establishing a quarantine area(s), an active surveillance program will be implemented to detect the presence of highly contagious disease agents in wildlife populations within the quarantine area. If wildlife populations are determined to be positive for the highly infectious pathogen, wildlife management principles will be used to prevent exposure to livestock.

Assessment of the risks posed by wild animals will require information regarding:
I. Density and distribution
II. Social organization
III. Habitat
IV. Actual or perceived contact with domestic species
V. Strain of the highly contagious disease
VI. Length of time wild animals could have been exposed to the virus

This information will then influence the level of measures required including:

I. Containment
II. Survey and surveillance
III. Population reduction

If wildlife populations are determined not to be infected or are not a biological risk of transmitting the highly infectious disease to livestock, a wildlife management plan will be implemented to keep wildlife populations from acting as mechanical vectors.

If wildlife populations are shown to transmit the disease to livestock, a process of population reduction (if ecologically sound) or procedures to keep wildlife away from livestock and poultry using tools such as double fences may be implemented.

181.13. Economic Zone Designation

Economic zone designations may help reduce adverse economic effects as a result of an endemic disease. If a disease is only established in a part of Kansas, it may be possible to establish infected and disease-free zones in order to retain some economic benefit. Disease-free zones, designated by the Animal Health Commissioner, must be effectively sealed off from the disease-affected zones by extremely tight movement and quarantine controls.

While zone designations (also known as Compartments) could lessen the impact on the economy, it would still impose ongoing movement restrictions on livestock industries. State and local boundaries may provide the most acceptable limits to establish zones because the general population identifies them as distinct geographical boundaries.

181.14. Vaccination

Vaccination for a FAD can be used in a number of different circumstances. In most cases, use of a FAD vaccine will have potential international trade implications. Thus, access and permission to use vaccines will be controlled by USDA APHIS. Vaccine use could be sought by KDA under a number of scenarios:

I. A highly infectious FAD that cannot be contained by quarantine and euthanasia of infected and exposed animals alone is discovered in Kansas. In this case (Ring Vaccination), vaccine could be used to vaccinate susceptible, but not yet exposed, animals. These resistant animals would form a barrier which would slow the progression of the FAD. Vaccinated animals would have to be slaughtered after the outbreak is contained using normal slaughter channels.

II. A highly infectious FAD is discovered in Kansas. Within the quarantine area are located facilities containing large numbers of susceptible animals; i.e. feedlots, dry lot dairies, swine
confinement facilities, etc. Vaccine (and anti-virals when available) could be utilized to protect these facilities from infection. These vaccinated animals would have to be slaughtered after the outbreak is contained using normal slaughter channels.

III.
By preventing infection of these facilities, problems associated with euthanasia of large numbers of animals are avoided and meat is preserved for human consumption.

181.15. Cleaning and Disinfection

All premises on which infected and/or euthanized animals have been present will be required to be cleaned and disinfected. This is essential to contain the spread of a highly contagious disease agent and is an integral part of the eradication process. Care must be taken to reduce generation and dispersal of infective dust and aerosols. If items cannot be adequately cleaned and disinfected, they will be properly disposed of.

A highly infectious disease agent contaminated premises, object, or non-susceptible animal that is identified to be cleaned and disinfected will be made free of the highly contagious disease agent within 48-hours of being so identified or within 72 hours of being classified as an infected or contact premises.

Specific guidelines for cleaning and disinfection in a FMD incident can be found in the USDA FAD Prep Plan (see references).

181.16. Appraisal Process

181.16.1. Federal

Under a USDA Secretarial Emergency Declaration, indemnity and appraisal becomes a function of USDA. At this time, animals affected by or exposed to disease “shall be appraised by an APHIS employee and a representative of the State jointly, or, if the State authorities approve, by an APHIS employee alone. The appraisal of animals shall be based on the fair market value and shall be determined by the meat, egg production, dairy or breeding value of such animals”. Where an epidemic is spreading, USDA is prepared to expedite approval of funds required to support operations and compensation.

In addition to disaster relief funding and programs outlined in the KRP, some provisions exist under State and Federal law to provide compensation to responding agencies and producers. Provisions for compensation are as follows:

I. 9 C.F.R 53.3, 53.8 and 53.10 address compensation for items that cannot be decontaminated and may later have to be destroyed.

Federal statutes allow for fair market value compensation for animals and carcasses as well as products and articles that were destroyed in an effort to effectively control or eradicate a disease. In addition, federal law also allows for compensation of materials and products contaminated during the outbreak.

181.16.2. State

Lacking a USDA Secretarial Emergency or Extraordinary Emergency Declaration or a Presidential declaration, if the Animal Health Commissioner directs euthanasia of animals,
the Animal Health Commissioner and the owner of the condemned animals will appraise the animals and the state will reimburse the owner.

181.16.3. Special Expert Appraiser

Services of a special expert appraiser appointed by USDA typically are used in situations calling for the appraisal of an unusual animal type or breed. Use of a special expert appraiser must be approved by the Animal Health Commissioner.

Additional cases in which a special expert appraiser will be used include:

I. The owner and appraiser have a significant disagreement as to the value of an animal(s) or material(s) and have reached an impasse on the matter.
II. Registered animals of high value are to be appraised and the appraiser does not feel sufficiently knowledgeable of their value.
III. No established market value for the animal(s) is available.
IV. Special expert appraisal services are required by specific program regulations or instructions.

Special expert appraisers may be identified from the membership of breed associations as well as from groups such as livestock judges, extension agents, officers of purebred associations, zoo curators, and packer buyers. The Appraisal Team must advise owners of purebred or exotic animals that special appraisers may be appointed to assist in the appraisals of these animals if the owner wishes. Should an owner wish a particular animal to be appraised as a purebred animal, the owner must present the Appraisal Team with registration papers documenting the animal’s purebred status.

Special expert appraisers should not have a financial interest in the animal(s) to be appraised and should not be compensated in any way by the owner.

181.16.4. Special Considerations

181.16.4.1. Equipment Availability

I. Local assets should be accessible until state and federal assets are made available.
II. State assets are made available with a Governor’s disaster declaration.
III. USDA assets are made available with an emergency declaration by the Secretary of Agriculture.
IV. Additional Federal assets are made available with a Presidential disaster declaration.
V. Any unmet needs for equipment will be outsourced through contractors.
VI. Individual state agencies have their own authorities to support emergency response operations.

181.16.4.2. Milk and Milk Products

Milk and milk products from farms and ranches in the quarantine area will be assessed by the FDA to determine disposition.
181.16.4.3. Meat

Upon diagnosis of a FAD in food or animals, the public will be apprised of the safety of meat consumption and/or animal food products depending upon the disease.

Meat produced from FMD-exposed animals is not a food safety issue.

Clinically normal animals in the quarantine area may be allowed to move to slaughter based on risk analysis.

181.16.4.4. Zoological Parks

Biosecurity plans must be in place to protect susceptible species. Zoological parks are advised to take steps to reduce the risk of infection. Steps include halting animal movements between zoos and park areas, preventing physical contact between visitors and animals, introducing stricter feeding policies, carrying out more frequent inspections, and disinfecting visitors and vehicles. In the event of a FAD, the Animal Health Commissioner has the authority to quarantine any susceptible and exposed zoo animal. Depopulation may also be considered and is within the authority of the Animal Health Commissioner.

181.16.4.5. Germplasm Centers

Under the Animal Health Commissioner's authority, germ-plasm centers, including semen, embryo transfer, and ova will be controlled according to the disease risk assessment. FMD virus may be transmitted by infected semen. Semen collected before a FAD introduction can be sold as determined by the Animal Health Commissioner. If a semen center is located in a quarantine area, no semen will be collected until a risk analysis has been completed.

181.16.4.6. Public Health

Kansas Department of Health and Environment Bureau of Epidemiology and Public Health Informatics will coordinate Human Disease surveillance and Public Health messaging regarding awareness and prevention of zoonotic diseases.

181.17. Recovery

181.17.1. Follow-up Surveillance

Surveillance after an outbreak should be carefully coordinated to optimize available resources. Many factors such as potential spread by wind or wildlife could warrant increased surveillance in some areas. Intervals between inspections and surveys may depend on the observed incubation period, available resources, and exposure risk. In addition, efforts must be made to educate producers about clinical signs of a disease and the importance of reporting information to veterinary officials.

Surveillance within an area will occur primarily through livestock inspection. Surveillance may involve slaughter surveillance, serological surveys, and investigations of other
suspect disease reports. Surveillance during the recovery phase is conducted to ensure the following actions take place:

I. Recognition of disease free status.
II. Repopulation.
III. Release of quarantine under the authority of the Animal Health Commissioner.

Other objectives that would be considered in the recovery phase include:

I. KDHE would determine length of restrictive covenant (when land is used for burial).
II. Conclusion of Indemnification.
III. Track and report agency response costs.
IV. Assess economic loss to businesses directly and indirectly impacted.
V. Identify and facilitate recovery assistance and programs.
VI. Coordinate social services/mental health.
VII. Identify recovery funding gaps (e.g., what might be provided through the Farm Service Agency).
VIII. Continue necessary inter/intra agency communications.
IX. Continue with virus elimination activities on infected premises.
X. Support sustained operations until eradication is complete.
XI. Identify wildlife concerns with protection/containment/restoration/euthanasia.

182. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities

Most departments/agencies of government have emergency functions in addition to their normal, day-to-day duties. These emergency functions usually parallel or complement normal functions. Each department/agency is responsible for developing and maintaining its own emergency management procedures.

182.1. Assignment of Responsibilities – State Government

The long-established role of State government in most emergency response operations to support local governments as needed changes fundamentally in a FAD incident. Kansas law authorizes the Animal Health Commissioner to take extraordinary measures to minimize the impact of a FAD on our economy. As such, state government will lead all response measures including those at the local level. The Animal Health Commissioner will serve as the incident commander. Thus, the Animal Health Commissioner has the authority to make necessary changes to incident command structures and to adjust to ever-changing conditions.

182.1.1. Kansas Department of Agriculture – Secretary

I. Serve as the Agency Administrator and Policy leader.
II. Notify and maintain communications with the Governor’s Office.
III. Activate Communications Plan.

182.1.2. Kansas Department of Agriculture – Animal Health Commissioner
I. Direct disease surveillance and investigation.
II. Coordinate with response partners.
III. Notify KDA Emergency Management Coordinator.
IV. Establish quarantine areas.
V. Activate Communications Plan.
VI. Issues stop movement order.
VII. Identify and publish traffic control points.
VIII. Direct cleaning and disinfection.
IX. Direct indemnification appraisal.
X. Direct euthanasia and disposal.
XI. Conduct epidemiological investigations.
XII. Conduct surveillance.
XIII. Ensure appropriate training and orientation.
XIV. Determine disease free zones and allow commercial business or travel.
XV. Determine need for national veterinary stockpile.
XVI. Direct restoration cleaning and disinfection and establish sentinel herds.
XVII. Request activation of SEOC, if appropriate.

182.1.3. Kansas Department of Agriculture - Incident Management Team

I. Activate when requested.
II. Publish Situation Reports and Incident Action Plans on a regular basis.
III. Invite KDEM to send a liaison.
IV. Set up and staff task forces and strike teams as directed by the Animal Health Commissioner.

182.1.4. Kansas Department of Agriculture - Dairy Program

I. Determine risk of milk and milk products.
II. Issue embargo against movement of milk and milk products, if necessary.
III. Educate producers on biosecurity and movement restrictions.
IV. Coordinate with milk cooperatives, haulers, and processors.

182.1.5. Kansas Department of Agriculture – Meat and Poultry Program

I. Report suspicion of animal disease at state inspected slaughter plants to the Animal Health Commissioner.
II. Assist plant owners with implementing biosecurity measures.
III. Provide personnel to support the response.

182.1.6. Kansas Division of Emergency Management (KDEM)

I. Activate SEOC.
II. Direct cooperation and assistance of state and local governmental agencies and officials.
III. Designate agencies for each Emergency Support Function (ESF).
IV. Promulgate Kansas Planning Standards to include FAD contingencies.
V. All other activities as described in the Kansas Response Plan.
182.1.7. Laboratories

- Provide analytical testing of animal samples for pathogens, toxins, and chemicals.
- Conduct analytical testing related to product trace-backs.
- Test samples for evidence of contamination by zoonotic or epizootic organisms.
- Coordinate information and data sharing.
- Provide timely reports of laboratory results.
- Maintain chain-of-custody where and when needed.
- Provide sample collection tools, equipment, and guidance to field investigators.

182.1.8. Kansas Highway Patrol (KHP)

- Assists with traffic control and enforcement of stop movement order.
- Assists with protection of critical infrastructure.
- Controls and limits access to the scene of the incident.
- Supplements communications.
- Assists with all evacuation and quarantine efforts.
- Assists with emergency transportation of samples.
- Monitors and detains, if necessary, outbound and inbound transporters of commodities at State border weigh or inspection facilities.

182.1.9. Kansas Department of Health and Environment

- Provides public information and education as it relates to zoonotic diseases.
- Conduct human disease investigations (see Kansas Biological Incident Annex).
- Coordinate specimen collection.
- Maintain a list of pre-selected disposal locations.
- Coordinate county approval of disposal locations.
- Determine environmentally appropriate disposal areas.
- Establish criteria for continued monitoring of disposal locations.
- Provide guidance for appropriate use of PPE.
- Provide guidance on the disposal of byproducts from cleaning and disinfection.

182.1.10. Office of the State Fire Marshal (OSFM)

- Provide oversight of cleaning and disinfection through the regional HazMat teams.

182.1.11. Kansas Department of Wildlife, Parks and Tourism

- Surveillance and monitoring of wildlife in a designated quarantine area.
- Control of potentially diseased or exposed wildlife.
- Support KHP and local law enforcement when available.

182.1.12. National Animal Health Laboratory Network

- Analyze samples from a FAD investigation.

182.2. Nongovernmental organizations

182.2.1. Trade Associations/Private Sector
I. Notify membership.
II. Send Representative to the Industry Multi-Agency Coordination Center.
III. Provide technical assistance to Kansas Department of Agriculture IMT, if requested.

182.2.2. Livestock Markets and Feed lots

I. Report suspected disease problems.
II. Disseminate information to producers.
III. Potentially provide diverted site locations.
IV. Comply with the Animal Health Commissioner’s orders.

182.2.3. Kansas Agricultural Emergency Response Corps (KAERC)

I. Serve at the direction of the Animal Health Commissioner.
II. Assist with sample collection.
III. Conduct surveillance and cleaning and disinfection.
IV. Oversee euthanasia.
V. Assist with volunteer management.
VI. Assist with warehousing and distribution of supplies and equipment.

182.2.4. Kansas State Research and Extension

I. Disseminate public information.
II. Provide technical assistance.

182.2.5. Kansas State University College of Veterinary Medicine

I. Provide diagnostic capability.
II. Provide veterinarians and veterinary technicians.
III. Maintain membership in the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN).

182.3. Federal Agencies

182.3.1. United States Department of Agriculture
At the federal level, USDA has overall responsibility to coordinate worldwide surveillance, preparedness activities, and implement eradication measures in close coordination with state and local governments. USDA provides a number of critical services and functions through multiple areas of expertise as discussed below.

182.3.2. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
USDA APHIS has broad authorities under a Secretary’s Emergency Declaration and a Secretary’s Extraordinary Emergency Declaration. In a widespread emergency, response efforts will be supported by other federal agencies under the National Response Framework (NRF) provisions. APHIS, in partnership with KDA, is responsible for:
I. Consulting with local authorities regarding eradication activities including quarantine, evaluation, euthanasia, disposal, cleaning and disinfecting, epidemiological investigation, vector control, and transportation permit systems.

II. Collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination of technical and logistical information.

III. Defining training requirements for casual employees or support agencies involved in eradication operations.

IV. Issuing disease declarations and defining the infected area and control zones.

V. Preparing information for dissemination to the public, media, producers, processors, and transportation industry.

VI. Funding for compensation, if available, to owners of destroyed animals as designated by the Secretary of Agriculture.

VII. Restricting payment of compensation in cases of violation.

VIII. Posting restrictions on interstate commerce.

182.3.3. APHIS National Veterinary Service Laboratory (NVSL)

I. Developing new strategies to prevent and control foreign or emerging animal disease epidemics through a better understanding of the nature of infectious organisms; their pathogenesis in susceptible animals; the host immune responses; the development of novel vaccines; and the development and improvement of diagnostic tests.

II. Conducting diagnostic investigations of suspected cases of foreign or emerging animal diseases in the United States, or in countries abroad through cooperation with animal health international organizations.

III. Testing imported animals and animal products to assure they are free of FAD agents.

IV. Assessing risks involved in importation of animals and animal products from countries where epidemic FADs occur.

V. Producing and maintaining materials used in diagnostic tests for FADs.

VI. Testing and evaluating vaccines for FADs, and maintaining the North American foot-and-mouth disease vaccine bank.

VII. Training veterinarians and animal health professionals in diagnosis and recognition of FADs through courses at domestic and international locations.

182.3.4. Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)

The mission of USDA FSIS is to ensure that consumers have the safest possible food supply. One of FSIS main goals is to improve coordination of food safety activities with other public health agencies. FSIS is tasked with protecting meat, poultry, and egg products against intentional contamination or tampering and recognizes that such protection measures must be coordinated with all relevant agencies.

I. FSIS will provide relevant testing and surveillance data to APHIS and KDA to ensure all potential sources of contamination are tracked and eliminated.

II. FSIS will collaborate with federal and state law enforcement agencies to prevent food tampering and protect the health of the public.

182.3.5. Farm Service Agency
In the event of a national emergency, USDA FSA is responsible for assuring adequate food production and distribution as well as continued availability of feed, seed, fertilizer, and farm machinery. County FSA Offices maintain emergency records that will aid in recovery of agriculture and rural communities and also assist local authorities in the event of a national emergency by providing a familiar channel to ensure emergency information reaches area producers.

182.3.6. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Lead agency for investigations in potential terrorism events.

182.3.7. Department of Health and Human Services – Food and Drug Administration
Provide technical experts to evaluate safety of feed, milk and milk products.

182.3.8. Local Government
Local governments in Kansas have a history of working together to protect communities through mutual aid agreements and are adept at organizing response resources faster than most government assets because of their proximity to incidents. However, FAD incidents will test the flexibility of most emergency plans and responders. Critical differences in an incident of this type include:

I. Discovery – Initial recognition of a developing FAD incident will most likely occur via producers and/or veterinarians who have daily contact with livestock. A federal or state Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) will follow up with investigation in an expedited manner, without public display or elaboration, to investigate clinical symptoms of a possible FAD. Initial notification to local authorities will be made by the FADD only when the incident requires it.

II. Federal Involvement – Unlike most other emergencies, FAD disasters impact the nation’s economy and international trade status from the moment a single case is found in the U.S. Because of its international implications, the USDA will become an active participant in coordinating response to an incident. Federal law authorizes USDA to assume lead of a disaster in any given state should USDA officials believe state and local response activities are not adequate. Declaration Process:

I. Index Case -If the incident is the first of its nature (Index Case) in the nation and given that the official diagnosis of a FAD in the U.S. is the responsibility of the Federal government, the State of Kansas will cooperate by issuing a State Disaster Declaration to coincide with issuance of USDA’s Secretarial Disaster Declaration. In an Index Case scenario, county governments are strongly encouraged to withhold issuing a Local Disaster Declaration until an official determination of a FAD is made to avoid an unwarranted and catastrophic economic downturn of livestock markets throughout the nation.

II. Additional Cases – If USDA has already confirmed the presence of a FAD in the continental US, the Governor may issue a State Disaster Declaration based on the
recommendation of the Animal Health Commissioner, in direct coordination with the Kansas Division of Emergency Management. The Secretary of the Kansas Department of Agriculture, or their designee, will serve as policy lead in the policy group. The animal health commissioner will serve as the Incident Commander. County governments are strongly encouraged to coordinate local disaster declarations with the Kansas Division of Emergency Management (KDEM) to ensure that adequate emergency measures are taken.

Movement Restrictions – This plan is largely dependent on the ability to restrict movement in at-risk areas. Every attempt will be made to ensure surveillance zones and quarantine areas do not unnecessarily restrict transportation or other commercial activities.

Duration – Incidents of this type may last months in the response phase exhausting local and state resources almost immediately. Extended operations will require long-term commitment of local resources. A conservative estimate of response period is six-months when the incident involves a confirmed FAD.

Tracking – Tracking the potential spread of the disease and estimating costs may require use of advanced methods. Geographic information systems and resources at the local level will be in high demand.

Kansas law requires counties to develop and maintain comprehensive emergency plans to provide an adequate framework for jurisdictional response to all types of disasters. Special consideration to agricultural issues is included in the most recent publication of the Kansas Planning Standards. County plans should include support from other emergency response agencies including:

I. Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) - Responsible for developing an adequate emergency organization inclusive of all local response agencies and capable of providing long-term support in emergency situations.

II. County Emergency Management (CEM)
   A. Responsible for coordinating local resources to support a FAD response under the direction of the KDA and the Adjutant General (TAG)
   B. Activate the County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) if the situation requires it
   C. Maintain contact with KDEM to coordinate possible requests for local support
   D. Inform BOCC of events and provide advice
   E. Assist with the acquisition of:
      i. Heavy equipment
      ii. Security (bio)
      iii. Law Enforcement
      iv. Personnel
      v. C&D (manpower)
      vi. Livestock equipment
      vii. Portable livestock chutes
viii. Trailers
ix. Pens
x. Panels
xi. Identification of potential diversion sites
xii. Identification of potential disposal sites
xiii. Assist in locating facilities for staging areas

III. County Sheriff
   A. Receive the initial notification of a possible FAD investigation by the FADD.
   B. Implement adequate quarantine, movement control, and other support measures in the exposed zone as directed by the FADD.
   C. Notify the CEM of the potential situation after discussion with the FADD.
   D. Ensure security measures are coordinated throughout the duration of the emergency.

IV. Fire Departments
   A. Assist with cleaning and disinfection operations.
   B. If burning of infected carcasses and materials is the appropriate disposal method in a specific area, the local fire departments will be notified prior to initiating such operation.

V. Public Works
   A. Responsible for supporting movement control operations by positioning appropriate signage and barriers as directed by the FADD.
   B. Provide heavy equipment for disease eradication measures.
   C. Coordinate with landfills for disposal operations, if necessary.

VI. County Health Department
   A. Respond to zoonotic disease incidents according to established protocols.
   B. Provide prophylactic treatment, if appropriate.
   C. Coordinate public information with KDHE and KDA.

VII. Public Information Officer
   A. Coordinate all media releases with KDA JIC.
   B. Organize town hall meetings and other outreach activities to ensure producers and residents are informed regarding response activities and mitigation strategies.

VIII. County Extension Agent
   A. Assist with identification of producers
   B. Assist with town hall meetings and community education
   C. Assist with the management of diverted sites

IX. Geographic Information Systems
   A. Provide maps and street level data to Incident Command and the SEOC, if available.

X. County Appraiser
   A. Assist with identification of potential burial sites.
182.4. Other Support Operations

Support from the National Guard may be requested through the Kansas Division of Emergency Management. Military assistance will complement and not be a substitute for local participation in emergency operations. Military forces will remain at all times under military command, but will support and assist response efforts.

Producer trade associations and other private sector organizations within the jurisdiction may assist with a wide variety of tasks based on their capabilities. Some of these tasks include:

I. Communicating with affected producers or industries
II. Providing technical support and other resources to assist in the response and recovery
III. Contacting local authorities (law enforcement, regulatory or public health, depending on the situation) in the event of a biosecurity threat or suspected livestock or poultry incident
IV. Tracking hazardous chemicals or laboratory reagents and positive controls and protocols to investigate missing items or other irregularities
V. Inspecting and tracking incoming ingredients, packaging, labels, and product returns to detect tampering or counterfeiting
VI. Tracking finished products to facilitate a trace-back or product recall
VII. Laboratory testing capabilities and surge capacity

Volunteer agencies, such as the American Red Cross, veterinary medical associations, local church/synagogue congregations, and assistive organizations, such as the Salvation Army, are available to give assistance with sheltering, feeding, additional needed personnel, and other issues, as necessary.

Assistance from surrounding jurisdictions may be available through the execution of a memorandum of understanding (MOU).

183. Authorities and References

183.1. Legal Authority

183.1.1. State

K.S.A. 47-608. Livestock Commissioner is to cooperate with federal officers.

The Animal Health Commissioner is authorized and directed to cooperate with the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture or any other officer authority in government in the enforcement and execution of all acts of Congress to prevent the importation and exportation of diseased animals and the spread of infectious or contagious diseases among domestic animals.

K.S.A. 47-607. Unlawful to transport uninspected animals into state; certificates of health required; rules and regulations of animal health commissioner; special quarantine.

It is unlawful for any person to bring livestock into this state which may be used in the preparation of meat or meat products within Kansas without first having the animals
inspected and receiving certificates of health therefor. All shippers or movers of such cattle must retain and present such certificates upon request. The Animal Health Commissioner is authorized to issue a special quarantine on such conditions the commissioner deems necessary to prevent the spread of infections and contagious diseases in Kansas.

K.S.A. 47-607a. Transportation of uninspected animals into state; special permit may be required to cross state line.

When the Animal Health Commissioner determines permitting is necessary, the commissioner may require such before moving any or all kinds of livestock into or through Kansas.

K.S.A. 47-610. State quarantine, sanitary and other regulations; veterinarians; compensation.

The Animal Health Commissioner is authorized and empowered to establish, maintain and enforce quarantines, sanitary procedures, and other regulations as necessary to protect the health of domestic animals in the state from contagious or infectious diseases.

K.S.A. 47-611. Quarantine and other regulations; notice of quarantine proclamation by the governor, enforcement.

When the Animal Health Commissioner determines a quarantine is necessary, the commissioner will inform the governor so that the governor may issue a proclamation thereof. The Commissioner may issue a quarantine without gubernatorial proclamation if the quarantine is limited in extent. The governor may require and direct the cooperation and assistance of any state agency in enforcing the quarantine or regulations established therefor. The Commissioner is in charge of enforcement of such quarantine and is empowered to enter any grounds to carry out such enforcement, whether on the Commissioner’s own behalf or through the use of the Commissioner’s designated representatives.

K.S.A. 47-612. Delivery of animals into quarantine; payment of costs and expenses; sale.

The Animal Health Commissioner may issue an order to the sheriff or representatives of the Animal Health Commissioner to take into custody and keep such animals subject to the quarantine regulations. If the owner fails to pay the costs and expenses of care and keeping, advertisement of the livestock and public sale are authorized to pay costs.

K.S.A. 47-613. Quarantine duties of Sheriff.

The sheriff to whom the existence of any contagious or infectious disease is reported shall enforce quarantine. The sheriff will not be held liable for damages incurred by reason of taking or detention of animals subject to the quarantine.

K.S.A. 47-614. Killing unconfined, diseased, or exposed animals.

If the Animal Health Commissioner believes it to be necessary to prevent the spread of disease in domestic animals, such animals can be killed and carcasses can be disposed of.

K.S.A. 47-615. Same; appraisement; inventory; payment to owner.

The Animal Health Commissioner and the livestock owner are to appraise and make an inventory of condemned animals and fix the value thereof. The owner to be paid the
value the Commissioner determines by the State of Kansas unless such is paid by the U.S. government.

K.S.A. 47-616. Same; right of indemnity.

Such right of indemnity excludes animals killed because of rabies, those brought into the state in a diseased or exposed condition, those brought in in violation of any law or quarantine order, those brought into the claimant’s possession with the claimant’s knowledge that the animal was diseased or exposed, or any animal belonging to the United States Government.

K.S.A. 47-617. Same; payment of indemnity; expenses.

Other than dogs and animals affected by foot and mouth disease killed by the order of the Animal Health Commissioner, the Commissioner shall issue to the owner of the animal(s) a certificate showing the number and kind of animals killed and the amount the owner is entitled for indemnity therefor and shall pay such amount. In the case of animals killed for foot and mouth disease reasons, appraisal shall be obtained through the U.S. livestock indemnity program and such amount shall paid by the state of Kansas.

K.S.A. 47-618. Execution of orders of commissioner; fees of officers; arrests; prosecutions.

The Animal Health Commissioner shall have the power to call upon the sheriff, undersheriff or deputy sheriff to execute his orders, and such officers shall obey the orders. Officers shall receive mileage and fees as provided for service of process in civil actions. For killing and disposing of diseased animals, payment for the first animal killed shall be made to the officer not to exceed $5.00; and, for each additional animal, such payment shall not exceed $2.00 or the actual cost of doing such work. Such fees shall be paid by the board of county commissioners of the county in which the services are rendered.

K.S.A. 47-620. Prohibiting entrance of stock from other states where disease has become epidemic.

The Animal Health Commissioner has authority to prohibit the entrance of any livestock of the kind diseased into the state from such infected district.

183.1.2. Federal

The Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S.C. 8301 et seq., authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict the importation, entry, or further movement in the United States or order the destruction or removal of animals and related conveyances and facilities to prevent the dissemination of livestock pests or diseases. It authorizes related activities with respect to exportation, interstate movement, cooperative agreements, enforcement and penalties, seizure, quarantine, and disease and pest eradication.

The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to cooperate with other Federal agencies, States, or political subdivisions of States, national or local governments of foreign governments, domestic or international organizations and associations, Tribal nation, and other persons to prevent, detect, control, or eradicate a pest or disease. If measures taken by a State or Indian Tribe to control or eradicate a pest or disease of livestock are inadequate, the AHPA authorizes the Secretary, after notice to and review and
consultation with certain State or Tribal officials, to declare that an extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence in the United States of a pest or disease of livestock that threatens the livestock of the United States (7 U.S.C. 8306).

183.2. References

183.2.1. USDA

Attachment 1 – Reportable diseases

K.S.A. 47-622. Report of disease to livestock commissioner. It shall be the duty of the owner or person in charge of any domestic animal or animals who discovers, or has reason to believe that any domestic animal owned by such person or in such person’s charge or keeping is affected with any contagious or infectious disease, to immediately report such fact or belief to the livestock commissioner. It shall be the duty of any person who discovers the existence of any such contagious or infectious disease among the domestic animals of any person to report this information at once to the livestock commissioner.

K.A.R. 9-27-1. Designation of infectious or contagious diseases. The following diseases shall be designated as infectious or contagious animal diseases and shall be reported in accordance with K.S.A. 47-622:

(a) Anthrax  
(b) All species of brucellosis  
(c) Equine infectious anemia  
(d) Classical Swine Fever  
(e) Pseudorabies  
(f) Psoroptic mange  
(g) Rabies  
(h) Tuberculosis  
(i) Vesicular stomatitis  
(j) Avian influenza  
(k) Pulorum  
(l) Fowl typhoid  
(m) Psittacosis  
(n) Exotic Newcastle disease  
(o) Foot and mouth disease (FMD)  
(p) Rinderpest  
(q) African swine fever  
(r) Piroplasmosis  
(s) Visceral exanthema  
(t) Johne’s disease  
(u) Scabies  
(v) Scrapies  
(w) Bovine leukosis  
(x) Other diseases as determined reportable by the Livestock Commissioner  
(y) trichomoniasis.

Additional Diseases that could activate the Food and Agriculture Incident Annex include:

- African Horse Sickness
- HP Avian Influenza (Fowl Plague)
- Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
- Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia
- Equine Piroplasmosis
- Glanders
- Goat and Sheep Pox
- Heartwater
- Lumpy Skin Disease
- Peste des Petits Ruminants
- Plague (Yersinia pestis)
- Rift Valley Fever
- Screw worm
- Swine Vesicular Disease
- Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis

Some diseases which can be contracted by humans from animals (zoonotic) include:

- Anthrax
- Brucellosis
- Glanders
- HP Avian Influenza
- Newcastle Disease
- Plague (Yersinia pestis)
- Psittacosis
- Rabies
- Rift Valley Fever
- Swine Vesicular Disease
- Tularemia
- Vesicular Stomatitis
- Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis
The actual distance in any one direction for the area is determined by factors such as terrain, the pattern of livestock movements, livestock concentrations, the weather, and prevailing winds, the distribution and movement of susceptible wildlife, and known characteristics of the agent. The quarantine area for FMD will extend at least 6.2 miles radius (10 kilometers) beyond the presumptive or confirmed infected premises.

### Definitions of Zones and Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infected Zone (IZ)</td>
<td>Zone immediately surrounding the Infected Premises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer Zone (BZ)</td>
<td>Zone immediately surrounding the Infected Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Area (CA)</td>
<td>Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance Zone (SZ)</td>
<td>Zone established within and along the border of the Free Area, separating the remainder of the Free Area from the Control Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Area (FA)</td>
<td>Includes a Surveillance Zone, but extends beyond the Surveillance Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment Vaccination Zone (CVZ)</td>
<td>Emergency Vaccination Zone within the Control Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection Vaccination Zone (PVZ)</td>
<td>Emergency Vaccination Zone outside the Control Area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Designations for Premises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal Category</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
<th>Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infected Premises (IP)</td>
<td>Premises where presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, case definition, and international standards.</td>
<td>Infected Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact Premises (CP)</td>
<td>Premises with susceptible animals that have been exposed directly or indirectly to animals, contaminated animal products, fomites, or people from an IP</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Premises (SP)</td>
<td>Premises with susceptible animals under investigation for a report of compatible clinical signs for the FAD agent</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Risk Premises (ARP)</td>
<td>Premises that have susceptible animals but none of those susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible with FAD. Premises objectively demonstrate that they are not Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises.</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premises Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Designated Zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitored Premises (MP)</td>
<td>Premises that objectively demonstrate that they are not Infected Premises, Contact Premises, Suspect Premises, or At-Risk Premises.</td>
<td>Infected Zone, Buffer Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaccinated Premises (VP)</td>
<td>Premises where emergency vaccination has been performed. This is a secondary premises designation.</td>
<td>Containment Vaccination Zone, Protection Vaccination Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Premises (FP)</td>
<td>Premises outside the Control Area and are not Infected, Contact, Suspect, At-Risk, or Monitored Premises</td>
<td>Surveillance Zone, Free Zone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Factors Used to Determine Control Area Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Additional Details</th>
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**Glossary**

**Agroterrorism:** is the introduction of an animal or plant pathogen, pest, or chemical contamination to food or food producing plants or animals causing economic loss and fear and jeopardizing the Nation’s stability. Economic loss in the food and agriculture industries, loss of confidence in the government, and human casualties could result from an agroterrorism event. Agroterrorism is defined as an act of bioterrorism.

**Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service:** (APHIS) is a regulatory agency in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) that works to protect and promote U.S. animal and plant health, regulate genetically engineered organisms, manage the Animal Welfare Act, and implement wildlife damage management activities. In the event of an agriculture emergency, APHIS uses emergency plans while partnering with the affected States to quickly supervise and eliminate the pest or disease outbreak.

**Animal Health Commissioner:** oversees the State’s animal health affairs and is employed by the State. Disease monitoring, regulating animal movements across state borders and animal welfare are all duties of the Animal Health Commissioner.

**Assistant Director:** a USDA employee who works in conjunction with the State Veterinarian to monitor animal health at the State level. The AD endorses health certificates, monitors animal health and animal disease in the State, and is responsible for supplies for disease eradication programs and veterinary accreditation. The AD, Animal Health Commissioner, and APHIS Veterinary Services will work together during an animal emergency to quarantine, euthanize, and dispose of infected animals. They also oversee the disinfection of premises, as well as perform epidemiological studies.

**At-Risk Premises:** locations within a buffer surveillance zone that have clinically-normal, susceptible animals.

**Available Resources:** Resources assigned to an incident, checked in, and available for use, normally located in a Staging Area.

**Biosecurity:** an approach that examines and deals with the risks of food safety, animal and plant health, and other environmental risks. Biosecurity concerns the protection against plant and animal diseases, zoonotic diseases, genetically modified organisms, and invasive agents.

**Bioterrorism:** an act of terrorism used to introduce a disease or death in humans, animals, or plants by releasing viruses, bacteria, or other disease causing agents. Bioterrorism includes the changing of agents found in nature to make them more resistant to medicine or increase the ability of the agent to be spread.
**Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE):** Commonly referred to as “mad cow disease,” BSE is a slowly progressive, degenerative, and fatal disease affecting the central nervous system of adult cattle.

**Buffer Surveillance Zone:** the area immediately surrounding the infected zone. The size of this area will be disease and weather dependent. Generally, movement of any animals within this zone will be under permit only.

**Centers for Disease Control and Prevention**
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) promotes health; the prevention of disease, injury, and disability; and prepares for new and emerging health threats. The CDC also monitors health, detects and investigates health problems, conducts research to enhance disease prevention, develops and advocates for public health policies, implements disease prevention strategies, and promotes healthy behaviors.

**Commingled Livestock:** Livestock of several owners combined into one unit as the result of an emergency or disaster.

**Contact Premises:** contain susceptible animals exposed (directly or indirectly) to animals, animal products, vehicles, equipment, people, or aerosols from an infected premise.

**Contagious Animal Disease:** spreads from animal to animal or herd to herd by direct or indirect modes and has above normal morbidity. Contagious animal diseases may be found in certain species of animals and may be associated with specific production practices.

**Control Area:** consists of the infected zone and the buffer surveillance zone.

**Cooperative Agriculture Pest Survey (CAPS):** is a survey system that tracks plant pest across the United States. Managed by APHIS, CAPS tracks pests by commodity.

**County Emergency Operations Plan (CEOP):** outlines the roles and responsibilities of local personnel in responding to emergency situations. The plan outlines how local officials will work with State personnel. For the purpose of this training, the local response plan will focus on the response to agricultural emergencies.

**Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC):** an organization providing structure to interstate mutual aid. Liability and reimbursement issues can be resolved by impacted states through requesting assistance from other member states.

**Emergency Operations Plan (EOP):** a document outlining the concept of operations for a response and the roles and responsibilities participating in the response. EOPs cover policy, location, and function of the Emergency Operations Center, key personnel, roles and responsibilities, and emergency response procedures. Plans address safety issues, emergency management structure, communications, property protection, recovery from disaster, continuity of operations, outreach, and resources.

**Emergency Support Function (ESF):** details the mission, policies, structures, and responsibilities of agencies for coordinating resource and programmatic support during emergencies.
Emerging Animal Disease: An emerging animal disease is a new or new form of an endemic disease in the United States that is increasing in occurrence. Emerging animal diseases could emerge naturally, accidentally, or intentionally.

Farm Service Agency (FSA): is an agency in the USDA which provides agricultural assistance programs to farmers, including conservation programs, disaster assistance, and loan programs.

Food and Drug Administration (FDA): protects the health, safety, and security of humans and animal drugs and other products and devices. The FDA advances the health of the nation by speeding the improvement of safety of medicines and foods. FDA also disseminates science-based information regarding food and medicine to improve health.

Food Emergency: A food-related emergency occurs when food ingredients or processed products that could impact public health are deliberately or unintentionally contaminated.

Food Emergency Response Network (FERN): has integrated the local, State, and Federal food testing laboratories into a system that can respond to biological, chemical, or radiological food contamination incidents. FERN is structured in a way that the formation, development, and operation of the network promote Federal and State participation and cooperation.

Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS): an agency in the USDA responsible for assuring the safety, wholesomeness, and labeling of the supply of meat, poultry, and egg products.

Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD): a highly contagious foreign animal disease affecting cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, deer, and other cloven-hoofed animals. This debilitating disease is described by fever and lesions on the tongue, mouth, lips, teats, and hooves of the animals.

Foreign Animal Disease (FAD): a disease that is not presently in the United States. This lack of exposure means U.S. animals have limited immunity to those diseases. Foreign animal diseases can be introduced into a country either intentionally or accidentally. Example FADs include Foot and Mouth Disease, Newcastle Disease Virus, Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus, and African Swine Fever Virus.

Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD): a veterinarian who has received specialized training in distinguishing foreign animal diseases from endemic diseases. FADDs typically work for State departments of agriculture or APHIS Veterinary Services.

Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL): Located on an island near Long Island, New York, the FADDL is where the United States, Canada, and Mexico study foreign animal diseases. Foreign animal diseases are diagnosed at the FADDL.

Free Zone: an area where the absence of a foreign animal disease has been demonstrated and meets the requirements of the World Animal Health Organization.

Geographic Information System (GIS): capture, store, analyze, manage, and present data that is linked to a specific location.

Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI): a highly contagious disease in birds. HPAI has the ability to spread rapidly, kill an entire poultry or turkey flock, and can cause international trade restrictions on poultry exports.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD 9): This directive addresses the defense of the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, disasters and other emergencies by establishing
national policy. Because the Nation’s agriculture and food system is widespread and open, it provides potential targets for terrorist attacks. Agriculture and food systems in the United States are vulnerable to disease, pests, or other agents that may occur naturally, accidentally, or are intentionally introduced. The directive outlines guidance on the agriculture and food systems in the United States to provide the best protection by including roles and responsibilities, awareness and warning, and vulnerability assessments.

**Incident Action Plan:** An oral or written plan containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing an incident. It may include the identification of operational resources and assignments. It may also include attachments that provide direction and important information for management of the incident during one or more operational periods.

**Incident Command Post (ICP):** The field location at which the primary tactical-level, on-scene incident command functions are performed. The ICP may be collocated with the incident base or other incident facilities and is normally identified by a green rotating or flashing light.

**Incident Command System (ICS):** A standardized on-scene emergency management construct specifically designed to provide for the adoption of an integrated organizational structure that reflects the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. ICS is the combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating with a common organizational structure, designed to aid in the management of resources during incidents. ICS is used for all kinds of emergencies and is applicable to small as well as large and complex incidents. ICS is used by various jurisdictions and functional agencies, both public and private, or organized field-level incident management operations.

**Incident Commander (IC):** The individual responsible for all incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and release of resources. The IC has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations and is responsible for the management of all incident operations at the incident site.

**Incident Management Team (IMT):** The Incident Commander and appropriate command and general staff personnel assigned to an incident.

**Infected Premises:** locations where animals with a presumed or confirmed foreign animal disease, based on clinical symptoms or laboratory results, live or lived.

**Infected Zone:** An area of intensive epidemiological investigation of farm animals and wildlife. This is the zone closest to the infected premises. The infected zone is also known as the quarantine or control area.

**Joint Information Center:** a component of the incident management system, addresses the dissemination of public information.

**Joint Information System (JIS):** Integrates incident information and public affairs into a cohesive organization designed to provide consistent, coordinated, timely information during a crisis or incident operations. The mission of the JIS is to provide a structure and system for developing and delivering coordinated interagency messages; developing, recommending, and executing public information plans and strategies on behalf of the IC; advising the IC concerning public affairs issues that could affect a response effort; and controlling rumors and inaccurate information that could undermine public confidence in the emergency response effort.
Kansas Response Plan

The Kansas Response Plan (KRP) outlines emergency operations, mutual aid, emergency services, resources, public information, and continuity of operations. Included in the KRP are the basic plan describing systems, strategies, and policies used to guide emergency management efforts; functional annexes outlining the Emergency Support Functions operational concepts, capabilities, and organizational structures; and appendices containing other plans and procedures to support the KRP.

Liaison Officer: A member of the Command Staff responsible for coordinating with representatives from cooperating and assisting agencies.

Mobilization Center: An off-site temporary facility at which response personnel and equipment are received from the Point of Arrival and are pre-positioned for deployment to an incident logistics base, to a local Staging Area, or directly to an incident site, as required. A mobilization center also provides temporary support services, such as food and billeting, for response personnel prior to their assignment, release, or reassignment and serves as a place to out-process following demobilization while awaiting transportation.

Mobilization: The process and procedures used by all organizations - federal, state, local, and tribal - for activating, assembling, and transporting all resources that have been requested to respond to or support an incident.

Multi-jurisdictional Incident: An incident requiring action from multiple agencies that each have jurisdiction to manage certain aspects of an incident. In ICS, these incidents will be managed under Unified Command (UC).

Mutual Aid Agreement: Written agreement between agencies, organizations, and/or jurisdictions that they will assist one another on request by furnishing personnel, equipment, and/or expertise in a specified manner.

National Agricultural Pest Information Service (NAPIS): database that tracks the location and movement of plant diseases and pest across the United States.

National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS): focuses on animal health emergencies, such as foreign animal disease or natural disasters, in the United States. NAHEMS has issued guidance documents covering topics including prevention, planning, response, and recovery.

National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN): a network of laboratories that share information regarding the findings of different diseases. This allows for a more support in animal disease diagnosis, standardized tests at all levels, secure communications, experienced personnel, and training opportunities for laboratory personnel.

National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System (NARMS): The FDA, CDC, USDA, public health laboratories in all 50 states, and local health departments in three major cities, including New York, New York; Los Angeles, California; and Houston, Texas, are involved in the NARMS. NARMS is a network to monitor the susceptibility and resistance of several zoonotic bacterial pathogens and noncompeting organism from animals, meats, and humans.

National Incident Management System (NIMS): A system mandated by HSPD-5 that provides a consistent, nationwide approach for federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; and NGOs to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide for interoperability and compatibility among
federal, state, local, and tribal capabilities, the NIMS includes a core set of concepts, principles, and terminology. HSPD-5 identifies these as the ICS; multi-agency coordination systems; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualification and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources.

**National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA):** supports research, education, and extension programs through land-grant universities to advance the knowledge of agriculture, environment, health, and well-being. NIFA helps to fund the research and education but does not conduct any of those activities. NIFA replaced the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CRSEES).

**National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS):** a reporting tool of the CDC that is web-based and allows for the online reporting of waterborne, foodborne, person-to-person, and animal contact disease outbreaks. This program is designed to collect information about risk factors to improve the ability to prevent disease outbreaks at the national and state levels. NORS replaced the Electronic Food-borne Outbreak Reporting System (eFORS).

**National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN):** a network of agriculture laboratories that can quickly disseminate information regarding plant pests and diseases that have been introduced into the United States. This allows responders and decision makers to respond with the correct action to eradicate the pest. There are 55 plant diagnostic laboratories that participate in the NPDN.

**National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL):** Located in Ames, Iowa and Plum Island, New York, the NVSL responds to animal health emergencies by supplying diagnostic support, reagents, and training to responders. The NVSL also manages the NAHLN.

**National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS):** supplies needed to respond to an animal disease outbreak. Included in the NVS are vaccines, vaccination equipment, personal protective equipment, animal handling and depopulation equipment, diagnostic tests, and decontamination supplies.

**Operations Section:** The Operations Section of the KDA IMT coordinates operational support to on-scene incident management efforts. Branches may be added or deleted as required, depending on the nature of the incident. The Operations Section also is responsible for coordination with other federal command posts that may be established to support incident management activities.

**Pathogen:** a living organism (e.g., bacteria, fungi, and virus) capable of producing disease or death.

**Personal Protective Equipment (PPE):** includes safety equipment to protect workers from injury or illness from contact with chemical, radiological, physical, electrical, mechanical, or other hazards. Face shields, safety glasses, hard hats, safety shoes, goggles, coveralls, gloves, vests, earplugs, and respirators are all examples of PPE.

**Pest Tracker:** a website managed by NAPIS and tracks agriculture and forestry pest using maps, news, and pest information.

**Planning Section:** The Planning Section provides current information to the incident commander to ensure situational awareness, determine cascading effects, identify national implications, and determine specific areas of interest requiring long-term attention. The Planning Section also provides technical and scientific expertise. The Planning Section is comprised of the following units: Situation, Resources, Documentation, Technical Specialists, and Demobilization.
Plant Diagnostics Information System (PDIS): facilitates lab activities for land grant universities, State departments of agriculture, and the USDA. The services provided are plant identification, insect identification, and plant disease diagnosis.

Plant Protection and Quarantine (PPQ): APHIS manages the PPQ which protects the agriculture industry from the risks associated with the spread of plant or animal pests through programs to help eradicate or contain the pests.

Post-harvest Plant Products: Post-harvest plant products are crops, plants, or other products after they have been harvested from the field.

Pre-harvest Plants: Pre-harvest plants are plants or crops that are growing in the field before they are harvested.

Quarantine Zones: Zones where plant or livestock movement, into or out of, is prohibited.

Restricted Zone: an area around the infected or presumed infected facilities, where livestock or human movement is strictly controlled or eliminated. The size of this zone is dependent on weather, terrain, livestock concentrations, etc.

Secondary Spread: the spread of a disease by a carrier or contaminated materials.

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs): are instructions to carry out standardized procedures without losing effectiveness and are also known as Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs).

State of Disaster Emergency: A condition proclaimed by the governor when, in their judgment, the actual occurrence or threat of a disaster in any part of the state is of such magnitude to warrant disaster assistance by the state to supplement the efforts and available resources of the several localities and relief organizations in preventing or alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering threatened or caused thereby.

State of Local Disaster Emergency: A condition declared by the chairman of the board of county commissioners or by other principal city executive officer of any city upon finding that a disaster has occurred or the threat thereof is imminent within their jurisdiction.

State Animal Response Team (SART): are interagency organizations that are committed to preparation, planning, response, and recovery to animal emergencies in the State.

State Plant Health Director: manages the PPQ operations in their respective state.

Strategic National Stockpile (SNS): a large bank of vaccines and medical supplies to be used during a public health emergency. The supplies in the SNS are to be delivered within 12 hours after being requested.

Surveillance Zone: is established along the border of the free zone, separating it from the buffer surveillance zone. Initially, this could include the entire affected State and those in close proximity to infected zone. This zone would be modified pending evaluation of tracing and surveillance results. Within this zone, responders carefully monitor livestock concentration points, tracing contacts with infected animals and premises and conducting vaccinations of livestock in a buffer zone around infected farms.
Suspect Premises: contain susceptible animals under investigation but with no apparent exposure to an infected premise or control premise.

Unified Command (UC): An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of the UC to establish their designated incident commanders at a single ICP and to establish a common set of objectives and strategies and a single Incident Action Plan.

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA): the Federal agency responsible for developing policy on farming, agriculture, and food. The USDA works to meet the needs of farmers and ranchers; promote trade and production; promote food safety, natural resources, and rural communities; and work to end hunger in the world.


Veterinary Services (VS): a division of APHIS and works to protect animals in the United States through improvement of health, quality, and marketability of animals, animal products, and biologics. Veterinary Services works to prevent, control, and eliminate diseases while monitoring and promoting animal health and productivity.

World Organization for Animal Health (OIE): a worldwide organization that works to improve animal health. The OIE is made up of 176 member countries and territories, including the United States.
# Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After-Action Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Assistant Director</td>
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<td>APHIS</td>
<td>Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service</td>
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<td>BSE</td>
<td>Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Corrective Action Program</td>
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<td>CAPS</td>
<td>Cooperative Agriculture Pest Survey</td>
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<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive</td>
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<td>CEM</td>
<td>County Emergency Manager</td>
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<td>CEOC</td>
<td>County Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<td>CEOP</td>
<td>County Emergency Operations Plan</td>
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<td>CERT</td>
<td>Community Emergency Response Team</td>
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<td>CIKR</td>
<td>Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources</td>
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<td>COOP</td>
<td>Continuity of Operations</td>
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<td>CPG</td>
<td>Comprehensive Preparedness Guide</td>
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<td>CWD</td>
<td>Chronic Wasting Disease</td>
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<td>DOC</td>
<td>Departmental Operations Center</td>
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<td>DHHS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Health and Human Services</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DMORT</td>
<td>Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DOT</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Transportation</td>
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<td>EAS</td>
<td>Emergency Alert System</td>
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<td>ECL</td>
<td>Emergency Condition Level</td>
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<td>EMAC</td>
<td>Emergency Management Assistance Compact</td>
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<td>EMS</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Services</td>
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<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<td>EOP</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Plan</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>U.S. Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<td>EPCRA</td>
<td>Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Emergency Support Function</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
<td>Federal Aviation Administration</td>
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<td>FAD</td>
<td>Foreign Animal Disease</td>
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<td>FADD</td>
<td>Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostian</td>
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<td>FADDL</td>
<td>Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>Federal Coordinating Officer</td>
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<td>Food and Drug Administration</td>
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<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>Food Emergency Response Network</td>
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<td>Farm Service Agency</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
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<td>HazMat</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials</td>
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<td>HPAI</td>
<td>Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza</td>
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<td>HSEEP</td>
<td>Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program</td>
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<td>HSPD</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directive</td>
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<td>IAP</td>
<td>Incident Action Plan; Initial Action Plan</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>Incident Commander</td>
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<td>ICP</td>
<td>Incident Command Post</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
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<td>IMT</td>
<td>Incident Response Team</td>
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<td>JFO</td>
<td>Joint Field Office</td>
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<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Information Center</td>
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<td>Kansas Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>Kansas Department of Health and Environment</td>
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<td>KDA</td>
<td>Kansas Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>Kansas Division of Emergency Management</td>
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<td>Kansas Department of Transportation</td>
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<td>KDWPT</td>
<td>Kansas Department of Wildlife, Parks and Tourism</td>
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<td>KHP</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRP</td>
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<tr>
<td>K.S.A.</td>
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<td>KSNG</td>
<td>Kansas National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>KVMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEPC</td>
<td>Local Emergency Planning Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACC</td>
<td>Multi-Agency Coordination Center</td>
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<td>MACS</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MRC</td>
<td>Medical Reserve Corps</td>
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<td>NAHEMS</td>
<td>National Animal Health Emergency Management System</td>
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<td>NAHLN</td>
<td>National Animal Health Laboratory Network</td>
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<td>NARMS</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIFA</td>
<td>National Institute of Food and Agriculture</td>
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<td>NIPP</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
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<td>NVSL</td>
<td>National Veterinary Services Laboratory</td>
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<td>OSHA</td>
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<td>PPQ</td>
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<td>State Coordinating Officer</td>
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<td>Target Capabilities List</td>
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<td>U.S. Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>U.S. Geological Survey</td>
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<td>Universal Task List</td>
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<td>VOAD</td>
<td>Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster</td>
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<td>Veterinary Services (APHIS)</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
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